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Abstract
This paper investigates the social preferences over labor market flexibility, in a general
equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand. We demonstrate that how the economy responds
to productivity shocks depends on the power of labor to extract rents and on the status quo
level of the firing cost. In particular, we show that when the firing cost is initially relatively low,
a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by all the employed workers with idiosyncratic
productivity below some threshold value. Conversely, when the status quo level of the firing
cost is relatively high, the preservation of a rigid labor market is favored by the employed with
intermediate productivity, whereas all other workers favor more flexibility. A more volatile
environment, and a lower rate of productivity growth, i.e., “bad times,” increase the political
support for more labor market rigidity only where labor appropriates of relatively large rents.
The coming of better economic conditions not necessarily favors the demise of high firing costs
in rigid high-rents economies, because “good times” cut down the support for flexibility among
the least productive employed workers. The model described provides some new insights on
the comparative dynamics of labor market institutions in the U.S. and in Europe over the
last few decades, shedding some new light both on the reasons for the original build-up of
“Eurosclerosis,” and for its relative persistence until the present day.
Keywords: employment protection, job creation and destruction, firing cost, idiosyncratic
productivity, volatility, growth, political economy, voting, rents, status quo, path dependency,
institutional divergence.
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1 Introduction
Employment protection legislation varies significantly across OECD countries. Relatively strin-
gent job security provisions are currently implemented in several Continental European coun-
tries such as Portugal, Spain, Greece, whereas other countries such as the U.K. and especially
the U.S. are characterized by relatively flexible labor markets.1 The current institutional status
quo observed across developed countries reflects the diverging paths of evolution of employ-
ment protection legislation and other labor market institutions on the two sides of the Atlantic,
over the past forty years. There is evidence that in Continental Europe firing costs have gradu-
ally become higher since the early 1970’s,2 the period traditionally associated with the build-up
of “Eurosclerosis,”3 and mildly reduced since the 1990’s. During the same period, the structure
of the labor markets of the U.K. and particularly of the U.S. has instead changed relatively
little, displaying over time a remarkably persistent, flexible regulation of labor relation.4
Part of the institutional inertia observed seemed to be related to the fact that many Euro-
pean Governments have implemented simultaneously two antithetical policy measures: on one
side they kept or sometimes even reinforced already strong protection policies to reduce job
destruction; on the other hand they introduced new flexible, fixed-term contracts, to push job
creation (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007).
The strategy to increase the flexibility of the labor market has been implemented at the
margin (dual track reforms), without affecting those hired on “regular” contracts, who are
still protected by high job security (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Saint-Paul, 1996; Cabrales
and Hopenhayn, 1997; Tealdi, 2011).5 Therefore, the protection of the traditional permanent
contract has often not changed significantly following the introduction of temporary contracts
(OECD, 2008). Furthermore, in a few major economies, such as France and Germany, there
1For a summary index of employment protection legislation (EPL) strictness, the reader may refer to OECD
(2008).
2See for example Caballero and Hammour (1998), Blanchard (2000), and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
3“Eurosclerosis” is a term coined by Giersch (1985) to describe an economic pattern observed in Europe in
the 1970’s and the early 1980’s, where countries faced simultaneously high unemployment and slow job creation,
despite some evidence of recovery of economic growth. In contrast, the United States experienced in the same
period an economic expansion, high job growth as well as relatively low unemployment.
4The U.K. labor market became indeed more flexible during the 1980’s due the reforms implemented by the
conservative government chaired by Mrs. Thatcher.
5Dual-track reforms have increased the flexibility of temporary contracts, leaving unchanged the EPL affect-
ing permanent contracts; however these reforms might have changed and reshaped the size and profile of the
electorate who supports EPL reforms. For instance in Spain, the intensive utilization and the extended scope
of the new fixed-term contracts deregulated in the late 1980’s lead unemployed workers and temporary workers
to strongly support in the late 1990’s the reduction of rigidities associated with the regular contract (Dolado et
al., 2002; Bentolila et al., 2008).
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is hardly any evidence that in recent years firing restrictions and other forms of labor market
rigidities for regular contracts have been reduced at all (OECD, 2008).
On the whole, despite the exceptions mentioned above, the big picture observed seems one
of significant persistence of the high dismissal barriers legislated over past decades in several
Continental European countries. This outcome is especially remarkable since the issue of
the reform of rigid labor market contracts, including permanent ones, toward more flexibility
has been in the past years often at the top of the political agenda of many governments
of Continental Europe.6 Furthermore, the different macroeconomic conditions present today
relative to the period of build-up of Eurosclerosis, make the relative persistence of many of
the institutional rigidities typical of Continental European labor markets, including in primis
EPL, an even more important and challenging open question. In this paper, we attempt to
shed some new light on these puzzling facts.7
More specifically, the goal of this paper, is to investigate how the interaction of institutional
and economic factors affects the emergence and the potential persistence of political support
for some form of employment protection regulations. In order to pursue this goal, we develop
and fully characterize the solution of a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand,
which carries three distinctive features.
First, we assume that the productivity of active firms evolves over time according to a
Geometric Brownian motion and an independent Poisson process, reflecting respectively the
realization of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and exogenous quit decisions by the workers,
which firms (probabilistically) anticipate. The existence of idiosyncratic uncertainty makes
firms and workers, which are both ex-ante identical, ex-post heterogeneous due to their variable
productivity, and leads to a non-degenerate distribution of productivity across active firms.
The second feature of the model is that employed workers appropriate a rent, i.e., an economic
benefit in excess of the utility of the unemployed. The extent of such rent represents the
amount of money that firms need to pay to the workers in excess of their outside option, to
cope with an underlying moral hazard problem, partly in the spirit of efficiency wage models
(e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). However, the overall rent will depend not only on the
monitoring technology adopted by firms, but also on politico-institutional factors potentially
different across countries, but regarded in this paper as exogenous. Such politico-institutional
6See OECD Economic Outlook (2011).
7As we will make more clear later, part of the explanation of the relatively little progress made on the road
to flexibility, is due to the decisive opposition of unions as well as of some pivotal (typically leftist) political
parties, which had some degree of political connection with the unions.
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fundamentals will be captured in the model by one parameter reflecting the power of extraction
of rents of the employed workers.8 In particular, we will assume it to be higher in Continental
Europe than in Anglo-Saxon countries. This assumption is motivated by different bodies
of literature in the broad field of comparative political economy (see for example Amable,
2009), that emphasize how labor market institutions depend on a diverse class of political
institutions. In particular, in the literature on endogenous institutions and comparative politics
of public finance, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) demonstrate that the “consensual democracy,”
i.e., parliamentary government coupled with proportional representation (see Lijphart, 1999,
for a classical taxonomy of the different forms of democracy), typical of Continental Europe
generates endogenously a political bias in favor of leftist parties, relative to the different forms of
“majoritarian” democracy typical of the Anglo-Saxon countries, which tend to favor the Right.9
Left-wing parties are in turn naturally connected with the unusually powerful European unions,
a connection which allows employed workers to extract relatively high rents from firms.10 In
the model, the entire rent appropriated by the workers will also depend on the idiosyncratic
productivity of the job, on the exogenous parameters of the stochastic processes governing the
evolution of the productivity of the firm,11 and on the interest rate; in general equilibrium,
this will generate a rich set of comparative statics results.12
Third, the reservation productivity at which firms eventually decide to quit operating, and
which also affects the total value of rent appropriated by employed workers, depends on a
legislated tax, or firing cost, imposed on the firms upon laying-off their employees. The firing
cost, which is determined through a political process based on standard majority voting, is a
key endogenous variable in the model. Lower firing costs potentially harm workers since they
decrease the rent appropriated by the employed. This we refer to as rent erosion effect. On the
other hand, lower firing costs decrease the total cost of labor borne by the firms, and therefore
increase job creation, raising the exit rate from unemployment, and increasing the welfare of
8We refer to the parameter in question as the “rent extraction power” instead of the bargaining power since
we do not use the standard Nash bargaining rule (or any other bargaining game such as Rubinstein, 1982, or
Shaked and Sutton, 1982) to determine the equilibrium wage.
9For instance in 2010 the trade union density as percentage of employees in the United States was 11.4%
against the 38.1% in Europe and 18.1% among the OECD countries (OECD Employment Database).
10See for instance Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005), for a discussion of this fact. The important con-
tribution in the literature of political economy of finance of Pagano and Volpin (2005), who show empirically
that proportional representation, as opposed to a majoritarian electoral system, correlates with relatively low in-
vestors protection and relatively high employment protection, is also related. Pagano and Volpin (2005) propose
in addition a theoretical model where these empirical patterns reflect causal effects of the electoral systems.
11These parameters will include the drift and the instantaneous standard deviation of the geometric Brownian
motion, which characterize respectively the average rate of growth of productivity and its volatility, and the
Poisson quit rate.
12See Section 2.2 (p. 9) for a more precise description of the sharing rule adopted and of its microfoundation.
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both unemployed and employed workers. This we refer to as job creation effect.
We show that the resolution of the trade-off generated by lower firing costs, i.e., a smaller
inter-temporal flow of rents, due to the rent erosion effect, versus a greater exit rate from
unemployment, due to the job creation effect, depends in particular on the parameter capturing
the rent extraction power of the workers. When this power is small enough, i.e., below some
threshold, there is little scope to protect jobs and the associated rents with legislated firing
restrictions. More precisely, in this scenario the workers are unanimously in favor of zero firing
costs, regardless of the status quo employment protection level. In the opposite case where the
bargaining power of the workers is above a critical threshold, we show that workers split in two
opposite coalitions, favoring respectively a rigid and a flexible labor market.Specifically, when
firing cost are relatively low, a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by all the employed
workers with idiosyncratic productivity below some threshold value. All the unemployed and
the most productive employed form a “non-connected” or extreme coalition to support low
firing costs.13 Vice versa, when firing costs are relatively high, a rigid labor market is preferred
by the employed workers with intermediate productivity, confirming the findings of Boeri and
Burda (2009). A flexible labor market is instead supported by an extreme coalition involving all
the unemployed, as well as the more and the less productive employed. Intuitively, regardless
of the status quo, the unemployed prefer to eliminate firing costs to induce firms to open new
vacancies, thus reducing the expected length of their unemployment spell.
The analysis of the politico-economic equilibrium reveals two additional insights. First, we
show that a complementarity arises in the equilibrium of the model between the volatility of
productivity and labor market flexibility: in a more turbulent environment, both the positive
job creation effect of lower firing costs (and partially on the welfare of the employed), and the
related rent erosion effect, are magnified. Second, we show that a substitutability arises in the
equilibrium of the model between productivity growth and labor market flexibility, as higher
productivity growth reduces both the job creation and the rent erosion effects.
The deeper significance of these results is that how unexpected productivity shocks14 affect
the political equilibrium of the model, depends on the power of labor to extract rents, and
therefore ultimately on the balance of power between leftist parties, unions, producers and
their political supporters. Specifically, employment protection is more likely to emerge and
13A similar type of coalition arises under some conditions in Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), where the poor may
prefer to side with the rich, and support a relatively conservative fiscal policy, against the middle class party.
14This refers to unexpected changes in the two parameters governing the evolution of the productivity of all
the active firms.
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persist in economies where workers have greater rent extraction power. This finding can help
explain the divergent evolution of the labor market institutions in high and low rents economies,
i.e., Continental Europe, where the Left was historically stronger and had gained considerable
political momentum earlier,15 versus the U.S. and the U.K., in response to similar negative
aggregate shocks.
This paper is related to a variety of different contributions including primarily previous
models of political economy of labor market institutions, such as Lindbeck and Snower (1988),
Bertola and Rogerson (1997), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003),16 and Saint-Paul (1993),17 as
well as the more recent contribution of Saint-Paul (2002).18 The main difference between our
paper and Saint-Paul (2002), is that his model addresses the question of how the preferences
for employment protection are affected by the rate of growth of embodied productivity within
a vintage capital model. By focusing on a disembodied form of productivity growth, we ob-
tain a number of different comparative statics results. In particular, whereas Saint-Paul finds
that higher productivity growth reduces unambiguously the political support for employment
protection regulation, we find that how growth affects the political equilibrium generally de-
pends both on the bargaining power of labor, and on the status quo level of firing cost. In
addition, Saint-Paul does not investigate how volatility, which plays an essential role in our
model, affects the politico-economic equilibrium.
In recent papers, Boeri and Burda (2009) and Bruegemann (2012) also address the question
of the persistence of rigid labor market institutions, within a version of the standard Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) framework. In particular, using a Nash bargaining wage determination
mechanism, Boeri and Burda (2009) compare the outcome of flexible-wage setting in a de-
centralized competitive search market with a rigid-wage labour market, where the salary is
independent of the individual match productivity. They show that employment protection is a
necessary condition for support for collectively bargained wages to arise in equilibrium. Sever-
ance protection, in the form of a deadweight firing tax, increases the acceptance of rigid wage
policies, because it further increases the utility of employed workers relative to the decentralized
15Examples of important episodes of leftist empowerment include the facts of Paris in May of 1968 (e.g.,
student and workers going on strikes, occupation of factories), and the Italian “Hot Autumn,” in Turin in 1969.
16By developing a general equilibrium model with both product and labor regulations, Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) address the issue of deregulation. They find that currently employed workers are more in favor of the
deregulation of the labor market whenever it is combined simultaneously with the deregulation of the product
market.
17See also Saint-Paul (2000) for a survey of this literature.
18Even though this paper closely relates to the published paper of Saint-Paul on the political economy of firing
costs (see Saint-Paul, 2002), we will make use of the wage setting rule described in the working paper version
of the same work (see Saint-Paul, 1999), which we find more convincing, simple, elegant and transparent.
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equilibrium. They also show that severance taxation increases the relative support for rigid
wages for employed workers with intermediate productivity, confirming the predictions of our
model. Using Nash bargaining for wage determination, Bruegemann (2012) finds that workers
value employment protection because it increases their bargaining power in wage negotiations.
By driving the distribution of match-specific productivity toward lower values, stringent pro-
tection in the past actually reduces support for future employment protection. However, when
introducing involuntary separations, workers value employment protection because it delays
involuntary dismissals. Moreover, workers in low productivity matches gain most since they
face the highest risk of dismissal. Thus, as we argue in this paper, Bruegemann concludes that
the existence of employment protection may endogenously create its own political support.
In the context of trade-off between employment protection and unemployment benefits, as
emphasized by Larsen (2004), we can classify European countries according to their choice to
protect more the jobs versus to support more the unemployed. The recent work by Boeri et al.
(2012) addresses this topic, by exploring the political economy behind it. By characterizing
employment protection and unemployment benefits as schemes redistributing between insiders
and outsiders as well as across skill groups, they find that configurations characterized by less
employment protection and more unemployment benefits, should emerge in countries with less
compressed wage structures. In this perspective, by exploring the political economy of un-
employment insurance, other papers such as Hassler et al. (2005) and Hassler and Rodr´ıguez
Mora (1999) are related to this work. Hassler et al. (2005) investigate whether generous unem-
ployment benefits in the past raise support for unemployment benefits today. In their model
unemployment benefits increase the workers’ attachment to a geographic location, increasing
the support for higher unemployment benefits. While in their model wages and separations
are exogenous and workers benefit from unemployment benefits, in our model they do not play
any substantial role. Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora (1999) show that saving and borrowing is
a good substitute for unemployment insurance when turnover is high. Therefore, with high
turnover, the median voter prefers low unemployment insurance. With low turnover, instead,
generous unemployment insurance becomes more valuable. Even though we acknowledge the
importance of potential the trade-off between employment protection legislation and unem-
ployment benefits, as emphasized notably by Boeri et al. (2012), our model is not designed to
investigate this problem.19
19Garibaldi and Violante (2005) study the different effect of severance payments and firing costs on unem-
ployment and argue that, interestingly, it varies according to the degree of wage rigidity. In economies where
wage rigidity is relatively high, severance payments are either neutral or have negative effects on unemployment.
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This paper complements the political economy literature on inefficient redistribution (e.g.,
Coate and Morris, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001), and on the persistence of various
classes of policies and institutions (e.g., Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Coate and Morris, 1999;
Be´nabou, 2000; Acemoglu, and Robinson, 2000; Acemoglu, and Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu,
Ticchi and Vindigni, 2011). In particular, the influential paper of Be´nabou (2000) demonstrates
that unequal societies, featuring potentially very different degrees of fiscal redistribution of
income and of inequality, or “social contracts,” can arise and persist in a dynamic model of
political economy of taxation, depending on the initial degree of income inequality. Moreover,
Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2011) demonstrate that under some conditions, such as high
income inequality, states with weak fiscal capacity, i.e., with a weak ability to raise taxes and
provide public goods, emerge and persists over time despite potential drastic shocks to formal
political institutions.20
This paper is also related to the seminal models of dynamic labor demand of Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) and of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The paper of Bentolila and Bertola
(1990) presents a partial equilibrium model with a stochastic structure identical to the one
assumed here, which we extend to allow for the endogenous determination of wages, labor
market flows and firing costs. The model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) has a dynamic
general equilibrium structure, based on the assumption that firms experience productivity
shocks described by a homogenous Poisson process (i.e., with constant hazard rate), rather
than by a combined Geometric Brownian process and a Poisson process, as assumed here.21
In addition, while in Mortensen and Pissarides’ model higher volatility has a negative effect
on job creation overall, in our model we obtain the opposite effect.22 Finally, while in the
model of Mortensen and Pissarides, the heterogeneity in match quality depends on the ex-ante
workers heterogeneity in productivity, in our model workers and firms are ex-ante homogeneous.
However the productivity of the firms, which evolves according to a Geometric Brownian
motion, generates ex-post (variable) heterogeneity in the match quality. The literature which
introduces Geometric Brownian idiosyncratic uncertainty to model productivity shocks within
20Therefore inefficient states, like rigid labor market institutions, have the potential to be self-stable, i.e., to
generate ex-post the political constituency supporting their own future political survival.
21This assumption implies that employed workers have the same marginal benefit from an increase in firing
costs regardless on the level of their idiosyncratic productivity and therefore they all have potentially the same
preferences over employment protection legislation. Conversely, in our model, the (almost sure) continuity of
the paths of a Brownian motion allows for a potentially negative correlation between current productivity and
preferences on job separation. Therefore, in our set-up more productive workers tend to demand less firing costs
due to their relative insulation from the risk of job loss.
22See also the comprehensive discussion of search and matching models of the labor market presented in the
excellent textbook of Pissarides (2000).
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a general equilibrium model of the labor market (with endogenous turnover restrictions) began
with Vindigni (2002). The same literature has been further developed within a search and
matching model featuring learning by doing (Nagypa´l, 2005; Prat, 2009), endogenous worker
turnover and wage distribution (Prat, 2003 and 2006; Moscarini, 2005), and to develop a notion
of rest unemployment (Alvarez and Shimer, 2011).23 In addition, in the general equilibrium
macro-labor literature with frictions, the papers by Caballero and Engel (1993), Ramey and
Watson (1997), Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Bertola
(1994), MacLeod, Malcomson, and Gomme (1994) and Yashiv (2000), Rogerson and Pries
(2005) play an important role.24 See also Caballero (2007) for an excellent discussion of some
of this literature.
This article also complements the extensive literature that ties firing costs to labor market
performance.25 Specifically, our work relates to the large empirical literature on the impact
of firing costs using macrodata and microdata. Studies using aggregate data include the
earlier works of Bertola (1990), Lazear (1990), and the more recent contribution of DiTella
and MacCulloch (2005), among others. There are also a handful of studies examining the
impact of firing costs using microdata, including Kugler (1999), Oyer and Schaefer (2000,
2002), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003), Kugler and Pica
(2004), Autor, Donohue III and Schwab (2006) and Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007). Overall,
the empirical analysis using data for several OECD countries finds a quite clear relationship
between measures of EPL and labour market flows.26 Countries with more stringent regula-
tions are found to have, everything else being equal, more employment stability, but higher
unemployment duration. However, the results are more mixed when analyzing empirically
23These authors define as “rest unemployment” the activity whereby a worker, who intends to reallocate, waits
for its current industry’s condition to improve. This concept differs from the notion of “search unemployment,”
which involves the actual attempt of a worker to move to a better industry and it is therefore more costly.
24Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) argue that the surge of unemployment in Europe since the 1970’s can be
explained with how layoff taxes and unemployment compensation linked to past earnings interact with an
increase in economic turbulence. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) address the questions of how taxes on
job destruction affect social welfare in a dynamic general equilibrium model of labor demand. Bertola (1994)
investigates the efficiency costs and distributional effects of obstacles to labor mobility, in a model of endogenous
growth with diversifiable microeconomic uncertainty. MacLeod, Malcomson, and Gomme (1994) investigate
how changes in the economic environment affect wages and employment in efficiency wage models. Ramey
and Watson (1997) explore the motivations for government policies that strengthen employment relationships.
Yashiv (2000) estimates the search and matching model of the aggregate labor market using Israeli data to
generate a characterization of the optimal behavior of firms and workers. Rogerson and Pries (2005) show how
labor policies distort hiring practices and assess the consequences for labor market dynamics and welfare, in an
economy with heterogeneity in worker-firm matches.
25See for example the interesting contribution of Bertola (1992), who studies the effect of labor turnover costs
on the average employment level in a partial equilibrium model of labor demand.
26Although international comparisons may be difficult if data are not comparable. See Blanchard and Portugal
(2001) and OECD (2004).
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the relationship between measures of firing costs and unemployment rates (e.g., Guell, 2010).
Interestingly, numerical simulations show that our model generates a smooth, hump-shaped
relation between equilibrium employment and the stringency of EPL, broadly coherent with
these empirical patterns.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the foundations of the model, whose
economic equilibrium is obtained and characterized in Section 3. The political equilibrium,
its properties and some important applications of the model are characterized in Sections 4, 5
and 6, respectively. Section 7 concludes with a brief discussion of the accomplishments of the
paper and presents some directions for potential future work. All the proofs are either in the
main text or are reported in the appendix.
2 The Economy
2.1 Basic Environment
The economy is a small and open one, populated by a continuum of measure one of risk
neutral workers who always consume all of their disposable income. Workers can be employed
or unemployed, and discount future welfare at rate r equal to the real interest rate. Hence,
letting tyτu
 8
τt denote the uncertain future income stream of a worker, his preferences can be
represented as27
Et
"»  8
t
erpτtqyτdτ
*
, (1)
where Et denotes the expected value operator, conditional on the information available at time
t. Firms are created by a small set of risk neutral entrepreneurs, by paying a fixed cost C.
The available production technology is Leontief, allowing a firm to produce some amount of
output per unit of time by hiring one worker only. There are no search frictions, and therefore
firms fill their vacancy instantaneously.28 The productivity x of each firm is normalized to
one at the moment when the firm is created, but it varies over time due to the realization
of two independent types of random idiosyncratic shocks. Specifically, x follows a Geometric
Brownian process, whose stochastic differential is represented by
dx  µxdt  σxdW, (2)
27Henceforth, we will omit to specify the dependence of endogenous variables on time whenever that does not
cause any confusion.
28In this respect, the model is different from a matching model with search frictions a` la Mortensen and
Pissarides, where both sides of the market have to wait for a trading partner. See Coles and Petrongolo (2008)
for a comparative discussion between different classes of models of job creation.
9
whereW stands for a Wiener process.The parameters µ P R  and σ P R   indicate respectively
the drift and the instantaneous standard deviation of x.29 In addition, each production unit
is also subject to a Poisson shock with arrival rate λ, which reflects a potential exogenous
voluntary quit of the worker, driving permanently the productivity of the firm to zero.30
Importantly, in case of quits firms do not pay any legislated layoff cost, which will apply only
to firings (the difference between quits and firings in the model will be clarified below).
To ensure the existence of an equilibrium where some workers are not employed, we restrict
the parameters according to the following assumption:
Assumption 1 µ   σ2{2.
Assumption 1 will be used only in the special case of λ  0.31 Because productivity is
variable, a firm may eventually decide to stop producing and to lay-off the worker. When
this event happens, the firm pays a mandatory firing cost F for dismissing the worker, which
represents a pure deadweight loss, i.e., the corresponding income is entirely wasted. The firing
cost F is chosen by the society through a standard political process based on majority voting,
described in greater detail in Section 4.
The value of a firm J p | R, θq active at time t P R , i.e., the expected present discounted
value of the stream of profits gross of the layoff cost as a function of its productivity x  xt,
conditionally on the endogenous reservation productivity R and on the endogenous job creation
rate θ, can be written as
J px | R, θq  sup
T¯PTt
Et
#» T¯ ^ Tλ
t
erpτtq rx w px | R, θqs dτ  FerpT¯tqIT¯ ¤ Tλ | Ft
+
, (4)
where Ft  σ tWs : s ¤ tu denotes the filtration generated by the Wiener process W . Notice
that the supremum is taken over the set Tt of possible stopping times within rt, 8q. However,
the actual random separation time is equal to the minimum between T¯ , i.e., the random time
at which the firm decides to stop producing, and the arrival time Tλ of the exogenous Poisson
29It is well known that the stochastic differential equation (2) has explicit solution xt described by
xt  x0 exp
 
µ
 
σ2{2

t  σWt
(
. (3)
The expression xt is clearly always positive, a result which matches the natural economic fact that firms cannot
produce an output with negative value.
30In other words, the stochastic process governing the evolution of the productivity of a firm is a compound
(Geometric) Brownian and (homogenous) Poisson process.
31If µ ¥ σ2{2, the steady state rate of job destruction is equal to zero, and therefore the model features a
long run equilibrium with full employment for any level of the firing cost (see Subsection 3.2).
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quitting shock of the worker. By standard arguments,32 the value function J p | R, θq satisfies
the following Bellman-Wald functional equation
rJ px | R, θq  max
"
x w px | R, θq  
1
dt
E pdJ q  λJ ,rF
*
, (5)
which characterizes the optimal stopping problem of the firm. The right-hand-side of (5) is the
maximum between the continuation value of the asset corresponding to the value of the firm,
and the flow-equivalent (or annuity value) of the endogenous firing cost F . The continuation
value is equal to the flow payoff generated by the match, plus the expected capital gain, which
is decomposed in the change of the value of the asset due to the Brownian shock, E pdJ q {dt,33
and to the Poisson quitting shock, λJ , respectively.
The solution of the optimization problem represented by equation (5) involves the imple-
mentation of a barrier-control policy.34 The firm closes down, lays-off the worker and pays the
mandatory firing cost F as soon as its productivity reaches a reservation level R, corresponding
to an optimally set threshold. The optimal stopping rule of the firm is characterized in the ap-
pendix of the paper. There, we solve the free-boundary problem represented by the differential
equation associated with the functional equation (5), or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation,
and the related optimality conditions (i.e., the value matching and the smooth pasting condi-
tions, which generate a set of mixed boundary conditions). For future reference, we define the
random calendar time T¯x pRq at which the stochastic process describing the productivity of a
firm active at time t P R  with xt  x, reaches the absorbing barrier R (ignoring the Poisson
quitting shock)35 as
T¯x pRq  inf tτ P rt, 8q : xτ  R | xt  xu . (6)
The value of a firm J p | R, θq also satisfies the initial value condition following from the
standard assumption of free entry, which implies that firms earn no pure profits in equilibrium,
since the ex-ante value of job creation, corresponding to the initial level of productivity x  1
is equalized to the cost hiring set-up C. Formally, free entry of vacancies implies that
J p1 | R, θq  C. (7)
32See for example Dixit (1993), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Peskir and Shiryaev (2006), and Stokey (2008).
33We use this notation to indictate the Dynkin operator associated with stochastic differential equation (2).
34A general result shows that the stopping region defined by S tx : J px | R, θq  F u is of the form p0, xˆq,
where xˆ is given by a smooth pasting condition (e.g. Pham, 1009, ch. 5).
35Note that T¯x pRq does not depend explictly on t because of the time-homogeneity property of transition
density of Brownian processes.
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2.2 Wage Setting Mechanism
We now describe the wage setting mechanism. It is useful to begin by dividing expression (1)
into a pair of recursive equations satisfied by the values of employment and unemployment. By
standard arguments, the value W px | R, θq of working in a firm with idiosyncratic productivity
x P pR, 8q, and the value UpR, θq of unemployment satisfy the following system of functional
equations
rW px | R, θq  w px | R, θq   1
dt
E pdWq   λ rU pR, θq W px | R, θqs , (8)
and,
rU pR, θq  b  θ rW p1 | R, θq  U pR, θqs , (9)
where w px | R, θq is the wage rate paid by the firm to the worker, b is the exogenous level of
unemployment compensation (or value of leisure). Both equation (8) and (9) decompose as
usual the asset value into the payoff and the related capital-gain. In particular, the capital gain
in equation (8) includes the expected variation of the value of the asset due to realization of the
Brownian shock, and the Poisson shock, which turns an employed worker into an unemployed.
The capital gain in recursion (9) reflects that an unemployed worker becomes employed with
flow probability θ, and initial productivity x  1.
The wage rate is determined according to the same wage setting mechanism proposed in
Saint-Paul (1999), where a worker employed in a firm with productivity x earns a salary such
that the corresponding value of employment is equal to the value of unemployment plus a
fraction β of the expected present discounted value of the output stream produced by the firm.
The sharing rule in question, represented by the equation (10) reported below, can be given a
micro-foundation which reflects the rents that firms need to pay to the workers to cope with
an underlying moral hazard problem, partially in the spirit of efficiency wage models (e.g.,
Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), consisting in appropriating of part of the current output. The
main difference between equation (10) and the sharing rule featured in the model of Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) is in the rent appropriated by an employed worker which represents a fixed
markup over the value of unemployment in their model, and a variable markup in the model
presented in this paper,36 reflecting the idiosyncratic productivity of the firm. Also, impor-
36This is because, unlike in the model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the reward from misconduct (moral
hazard) in Saint-Paul’s model is, as already mentioned, getting access to a technology which allows to steal
(moral hazard problem) an exogenous fraction of the firm’s (variable) output. Even though the stealing activity
is not verifiable by a court, the worker may be caught (with constant probability) in the process of stealing, in
which case it is fired. The efficiency wage is therefore the price which deters workers from trying to steal.
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tantly, the rent appropriated by the employed depend not only on the monitoring technology
available to the firm, but also on the fraction of output that they can appropriate, which can
be interpreted as reflecting the political power of organized labor. This is relatively high in
Continental Europe, and relatively low in the Anglo-Saxon countries (see the discussion of this
point in the Introduction).37
W px | R, θq  UpR, θq   βV px | Rq . (10)
In this expression, W px | R, θq and UpR, θq are defined recursively by (8) and (9), and
V px | Rq  Et
#» T¯xpRq ^ Tλ
t
erpτtqxτdτ | xt  x
+
, (11)
represents the expected present discounted value of the future output stream generated by a
firm having at time t a productivity level xt  x, up to the minimum between the endogenous
absorption time T¯x pRq defined by (6), and the arrival time Tλ of the exogenous Poisson quitting
shock. The expected value in (10) is computed with respect to the probability distribution
of the random time T¯x pRq ^ Tλ. Finally, the parameter β P p0, 1q in (10) represents the rent
extraction power of employed workers.
The sharing rule (10) has several important implications for the model. First, the firing
cost affects wages only indirectly, i.e., by reducing the reservation productivity, rather than
also directly, i.e., by affecting the relative bargaining power of workers and firms.38 Second,
the extraction by the workers of a (variable) rent over and above the value of unemployment
leads to involuntary unemployment, since the unemployed are willing to work for a wage lower
than the wage paid to the employed, but firms are nonetheless unwilling to hire them due to
the underlying moral hazard problem existing at the microeconomic level. While the effects of
employment protection legislation over the bargaining power of the firms are also potentially
interesting, we intend to focus the attention only on the role of the firing cost in extending the
duration of jobs, which the sharing rule (10) allows us to do. Third, the sharing rule (10) will
37Moreover, Acemoglu and Newman (2001) document the interesting fact that even though Continental
European economies have potentially access to the same monitoring technology as the U.S. and the U.K, clearly
they have significantly less investment in monitoring (which also raises the rent of the employed along with
pro-Left political institutions). An explanation is provided by Gordon (1996), who argues that the differences
in corporate structures (including the level of monitoring) observed across countries reflect the level of control
over the natural tendency of corporate bureaucracies to expand their sizes. In the U.S, corporate bureaucracies
have been allowed to do so more than anywhere else in Continental Europe.
38This is the case, for example, if wages are set with Nash bargaining, in which case higher firing costs (which
firms are supposed to pay), make workers stronger at the bargaining table by increasing the cost of a negotiation
breakdown for the firms (see for example Pissarides, 2000, p. 42).
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imply that separations are decided unilaterally by firms, rather than “consensually” as they
do under Nash bargaining, and therefore the break-up of a “match” reflects, in a proper sense,
the “firing” of the worker by the firm.39 See also Footnote 40 for further discussion of this
issue.
Notice that because the worker is fired and the match broken at the moment the absorbing
barrier R is reached, it is the case that V pRq  0. This fact and the sharing rule (10) imply
that the following terminal condition
W pR | θq  U pR | θq , (12)
according to which the value of employment at the reservation productivity R is equal to the
value of unemployment, is also (mechanically) true. As demonstrated in the appendix, the
wage schedule implied by the sharing rule (10) reads40
w px | R, θq  b  θβV p1 | Rq   βx. (13)
Clearly, the wage is greater than b for any value of x; moreover, it increases both with idiosyn-
cratic productivity and with the exit rate from unemployment in partial equilibrium. Closed-
form expressions (for given R and θ) are also computed in the appendix both for V p | Rq and
for J p | R, θq and read, respectively
V px | Rq 
x
r   λ µ

R1αxα
r   λ µ
, (14)
and
J px | R, θq  p1 βqx
r   λ µ

b
r   λ

θβ
r   λ

1R1α
r   λ µ



p1 βqR1αxα
α pr   λ µq
, (15)
where α corresponds to the negative root of the characteristic polynomial associated with
the differential equation satisfied by J p | R, θq, whose expression is reported in the appendix.
39Under a Nash bargaining mechanism, the decision to dissolve an employment relationship is always consen-
sual. This is because whenever the surplus of the match is negative, both J pxq   0 and Wpxq   U , due to the
transferability of utility. Therefore, the firm prefers to dissolve the match and the worker prefers to quit rather
than continuing working. See Pissarides (2000, p. 42) for further discussion.
40Note that the sharing rule (10) implies that separations are decided unilaterally by firms, i.e., at the
reservation productivity, employed workers would prefer to go on with the match rather than splitting, as the
(potential) wage rate is greater than the flow value of unemployment since from equation (10) and equation
(13) we have that w pRq  b  θβV p1 | Rq   βR  rU βR ¡ rU . Conversely, if wages are set by bargaining a`
la Nash, workers earn a zero rent at the margin of job destruction, and w pRq  rU , since the net surplus of a
match is equal to zero at that point. This implies that separations are always mutually optimal for firms and
workers, therefore there is no difference between layoffs and quits and no “firing” of workers ever takes place.
See Pissarides (2000, p. 42) for further details.
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Note finally that in partial equilibrium wages decreases with the reservation productivity, since
workers expect to earn a higher flow of rent as R decreases, an effect which raises the wage
rate earned per unit of time.
3 Economic Equilibrium
3.1 Aggregation
In this subsection, we begin the description of the economic equilibrium of the model, assuming
that a steady state featuring positive job creation and job destruction exists. In our model each
firm is created at some point in time, and experiences thereafter the realization of idiosyncratic
shocks to its productivity, until the time when the absorbing barrier R is reached. While the
duration of the life-span of each firm is random, the evolution over time of the cohort of firms
created at the same point in time is deterministic, since every cohort of new firms is formed by a
continuum of units. Therefore, by the law of large numbers, the deterministic fraction of firms
of each cohort that are still active at any point in time following their creation, corresponds
to the survival probability of a firm from the same cohort up to that time.
Because the transition density function of the stochastic process (2) describing the dynamics
of productivity is time-homogenous, the random time T¯ pRq  T¯1 pRqt elapsed since the time
t of creation of a firm (with productivity is xt  1), at the moment when absorption takes
place, does not depend on the calendar time of creation of the firm. Therefore, we can write
the probability distribution of T¯ pRq as follows
P
 
T¯ pRq ^ Tλ ¡ τ
(

»  8
R
p˜λ p1, ξ; τq dξ,
where p˜λ p1, ; τq denotes the time-homogenous transition density function of x, conditional on
the absence of absorption or exogenous quit at rate λ since the moment of creation of the firm
t up to time t  τ .
At time s, the flow of workers from unemployment into employment, equivalent to the mass
of newly created production units, has measure θs p1 Lsq, where Ls denotes the total mass of
employed workers at s. Therefore, assuming that the economy begins operating at time zero,
the total employment Lt at time t can be decomposed as the integral sum of the firms created
over the period r0, ts, weighting the mass of firms of each cohort41 by the survival probability
up to time t of their “representative” unit, so that
41We remind that each active firm hires one worker only.
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Lt 
» t
0
θts p1 LtsqP
 
T¯ pRq ^ Tλ ¡ s
(
ds. (16)
In the steady state, all aggregate labor market outcomes are stationary, and therefore
Lt  L, θt  θ, and δt  δ, where δt indicates the aggregate job destruction rate. Moreover,
the labor market flows-balance condition
δL  θ p1 Lq , (17)
equating the number of jobs destroyed per unit of time, δL, to the number of jobs created,
θ p1 Lq, also applies in the steady state, and therefore L  θ{pδ θq.42 Combining the steady
state form of expression (16), obtained by imposing the condition of stationarity and letting
t Ò  8, and equation (17), the aggregate steady state job destruction rate δ can be written as
δ 
1³ 8
0 P
 
T¯ pRq ^ Tλ ¡ t
(
dt
. (18)
This result completes the description of the partial economic equilibrium of the model.
3.2 Characterization of the Economic Equilibrium
For any given level of firing cost implemented, the economic equilibrium of the model is defined
by a pair of equations in two endogenous variables, the reservation productivity R and the exit
rate from unemployment θ. The first of these equations is the free entry condition, which can
be computed from (7) and (15) and reads
p1 βq
r   λ µ

b
r   λ

θβ
pr   λq

1R1α
r   λ µ



p1 βqR1α
α pr   λ µq
 C. (19)
The second equation corresponds to the value matching condition, which arises from the so-
lution of the optimal stopping problem of the firm (see the appendix), and establishes the
continuity of the firm’s value function upon closing down. This equation reads
p1 βqR
r   λ µ

b
r   λ

θβ
r   λ

1R1α
r   λ µ



p1 βqR
α pr   λ µq
 F. (20)
Equation (19) can be used to obtain the expression of the rate of job creation, as a function
of the reservation productivity, or
θ 
r   λ
piβ p1R1αq

p1 βqR1α   pi pr   λ µq

1 β
r   λ µ

b
r   λ
 C


, (21)
42Out of the steady state, instead, employment evolves according to the first order differential equation
dLt{dt  p1  Ltq θt  δtLt.
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where pi  |α|.43 Subtracting member-by-member equation (19) and equation (20) one obtains
a single equation defining implicitly the equilibrium value of R, or
1 β
r   λ µ

1R 
RR1α
α


 C   F. (22)
Equation (22) states that the expected present discounted value of the flow of gross profits
of a firm is equal to the sum of the fixed set-up cost and the firing cost. The economic
equilibrium of the model has a recursive structure. Equation (22) defines a downward-sloping
relation between R and F , which determines the unique equilibrium value of the reservation
productivity, as a function of a set of exogenous parameters and of the firing cost (which are
endogenous in the political equilibrium of the model, but are still treated as given at this
stage).44 Finally, the equilibrium value of θ can be computed using the equilibrium value of
R and equation (20). Since equation (20) defines a strictly upward sloping locus in the pR, θq
plane, the economic equilibrium of the model is unique, and determined at the stage up to the
endogenous firing cost F .
Note that equation (20) implies that around the separation point the firm is making losses
(i.e., its value is negative), but the existence of firing costs prevent what Caballero (2007)
defines as “zoombie” firms to shed unproductive workers.
Remark 1 According to equation (21), the job creation rate is always positive if the following
sufficient condition holds
C ¤ CMAX 
1 β
r   λ µ

b
r   λ
. (23)
Remark 2 Since the productivity of a firm is always non-negative due to the assumption
that its dynamics (up to voluntary quits) is described by a Geometric Brownian process, see
equation (2), the reservation productivity R has a lower bound at zero (potentially reached in
an infinite time). Equation (22) therefore implies that the level of the firing cost obtaining as
43We now assume that θ is positive; later we will provide a condition ensuring that this is always the case as
the set-up cost C is low enough (see condition (23) in Remark 1).
44Interestingly, even though higher firing costs are potentially more costly for the firm, the probability that
the firm will actually pay them decreases with F when λ ¡ 0. This follows by recalling that firing costs are
paid if, and only if, T¯ pRq   Tλ, since quits are not taxed. Moreover, we have that (see Borodin and Salminen,
1996, formula 1.2.2, p. 198), that
P
 
T¯x0 pRq   Tλ
(
 P
!
T¯z0

Rˆ
	
  Tλ
)
 P
"
inf
0 s Tλ
z0   σWs   ηs   Rˆ
*
 e

η
σ

c
2λ  η
2
σ2

Rˆz0
σ
.
The RHS of this expression decreases with F since the reservation productivity falls, and so does the probability
that T¯ pRq   Tλ.
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RÑ 0, conditionally on C, reads
Fˆ 
1 β
r   λ µ
 C. (24)
If F  Fˆ , firms never close down and therefore the model has a steady state where the rate of
job destruction is λ (i.e., separations are only due to exogenous quits). It is straightforward to
verify, using equation (19) that θ tends to a positive limit, θ pR  0q, as R Ñ 0;45 moreover,
standard arguments and expression (24) imply that steady state employed is equal to
L pR  0q 
pr   λ µq

1β
r λµ 
b
r λ  C
	
pr   λ µq

1β
r λµ 
b
r λ  C
	
  λβr λ
. (25)
To ensure the existence of a steady state featuring both endogenous and exogenous job
destruction, we introduce the ad hoc restriction that the firing cost cannot be higher than
some given threshold FMAX P

0, Fˆ
	
. Summarizing, the firing and the set-up cost are subject
the set of restrictions reported in the following assumption.
Assumption 2 F   FMAX   Fˆ , where Fˆ is defined in equation (24) and C ¤ CMAX , where
CMAX is defined by (23).
We conclude this subsection by reporting the expression of δ, which is computed in the
appendix, the expression of the ergodic probability density function of productivity across
active firms, which is also computed in the appendix of the paper, in the case where F ¡ 0,
and of the expected value of the duration of a job conditional on its current productivity.
Proposition 1 If F P p0, FMAXs, the steady state aggregate job destruction rate, δ, reads,
δ 
λ
p1Rφ2q
, (26)
and where
δ0 
 
σ2{2

 µ
Rˆ 

η
ln pRq
, (27)
is the aggregate job destruction rate if there is no Poisson quitting shock (i.e., λ  0), with
Rˆ   | lnR|, and η 

µ
 
σ2{2

.46 In addition, the ergodic cross-sectional distribution of
productivity across firms, Ψλ pq, has probability density function ψλpxq represented by
47
ψλpxq 
φ2φ1
pφ2  φ1q
"
Ix¥1   IR x 1xφ1φ2
	
Rφ1φ2

xφ11

1Rφ2
	1*
, (28)
45We remind the reader that the given the existence of a monothonic, one-to-one relation between firing costs
and reservation productivity, it is equivalent, for the analysis of the equilibrium, to let RÑ 0, and to let F Ñ Fˆ .
46A proof is available upon request from the authors that δ tends to δ0 as λÑ 0.
47We are especially grateful to Bjoern Bruegemann for his help in the computation of the ergodic distribution
of productivity across active firms.
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where I denotes the indicator function defined in the standard way, and φ1 and φ2 are constant
defined in the equation (72) reported in the appendix, with φ1 ¡ 0, φ2   0 and φ2  φ1   0.
Proof. See appendix.
Remark 3 Equation (22) implies that R  1 obtains in the limit case where F  0 and C  0,
i.e., the reservation productivity is equal to the standardized initial productivity level. As a
result, both the rate of job creation (21) and the rate of job destruction (27) are infinite, that is
people find and lose jobs instantaneously (and the economy is “fully flexible”).48 Therefore the
expected duration of any spell of employment and of unemployment is infinitesimal. Workers
are constantly matched and existing matches are constantly destroyed. Workers alternate
infinitesimal spells of employment with infinitesimal spells of unemployment in such a way that
the fraction of time spent in unemployment is strictly positive. Moreover, the cross-sectional
distribution of productivity across employment is a Dirac distribution at x  1.
Finally, for the limit case in which λ  0 and R  0 we show (see appendix) that employ-
ment is equal to 1.
Under an additional condition on the fundamental parameters of the model, the cross-
sectional distribution of productivity has finite mean value.
Assumption 3 µ   λ
 
σ2{2

.
Corollary 1 The mean value EΨrxs of the ergodic distribution (28) is equal to
EΨrxs 
λ
λ µ pσ2{2q
1R1φ2
1Rφ2
. (29)
Proof. Straightforward integration of equation with respect to the density defined by
equation (28).
An important corollary of Proposition 1 concerns how EPL affects the mean level of produc-
tivity across establishments EΨrxs, which is equivalent to the mean value of the productivity
of labor (as one firms hires one worker only).
Corollary 2 Higher firing costs reduce the equilibrium average productivity of labor.
48As already anticipated, if we introduced search frictions by assuming a matching function, both sides of the
market, firms and workers, would be rationed, i.e., find a match in a positive expected time. Conversely, in the
current model, vacancies are filled immediately and only workers experience “wait unemployment.” However,
we conjecture that the structure of the preferences would still depend on employment status and idiosyncratic
productivity similarly to our model, and therefore the structure of the equilibrium would not essentially change,
depending on properties of the particular search technology assumed.
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Proof. Straightforward differentiation of equation (29).
In our economy, this result is not surprising since firing costs correspond to a pure dead-
weight loss, and have no potential role in improving the competitive allocation of resources.49
The result, however, is not necessarily true in economies featuring some market failure. See for
example Ramey and Watson (1997) or Chari, Restuccia and Urrutia (2005), for a rationale of
why dismissal costs may improve the allocation of resources and TFP relative to the Walrasian
benchmark.50
Furthermore, we can compute the expected value of lifetime of a firm conditionally on its
productivity.
Proposition 2 The expected duration of a job with current productivity x reads
Et

T¯x pRq ^ Tλ


1
λ

1
 x
R
	φ2
. (30)
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 3 If λ  0 (i.e., Tλ   8), the expected duration of a firm with productivity x
reads
Et

T¯x pRq


ln pxq  ln pRq
|η|
. (31)
Proof. Straightforward application of de l’Hospital’s rule to equation (30).
Differentiation of equation (31) shows the intuitive result that higher embodied productivity
growth and current productivity increase, for given R, the life expectancy of a firm by driving
productivity away from R.51 Also, for a given R, higher instantaneous variance reduces the
expected duration of a job by making a critical productivity downfall more likely to happen.
This effect is instead dampened in general economic equilibrium, where higher σ reduces the
reservation productivity (see below), and therefore tends to increase the expected lifetime of a
firm. Overall Et

T¯x pRq

is therefore a non-monotonic function of σ.
49Bertola (1994) demonstrates an analogous result in an endogenous growth model where firms experience
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and shows that EPL has a monothonic negative effect on the rate of growth.
Similarly, in Saint-Paul (2002), firing costs artificially extend the life-cycle of relatively obsolete firms and slow
down the pace of technological renewal of the economy.
50Interestingly, Chari, Restuccia and Urrutia (2005) report evidence (see figure 1, p. 5) of a positive correlation
between EPL and TFP (relative to US level) across European countries. Of course, where the correlation in
question uncovers any causal effect or not remains an open question.
51It is also the case that in general economic equilibrium (see below) productivity growth increases the
expected duration of a production unit by reducing the reservation productivity. Therefore both the partial
and the general economic equilibrium effects of µ on the expected duration of a production unit go in the same
direction.
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3.3 Comparative Statics
The economic equilibrium of the model has a number of comparative statics properties, some
of which are non-standard, which are discussed next, with the qualification that the firing
cost will still be treated as an exogenous parameter at this stage of the analysis of the model
(general economic equilibrium).52
1. A higher value of the firing cost F reduces the reservation productivity R since firms
prefer to hold on longer when layoffs are more costly; as a result, both the aggregate
rate of job destruction δ and the exit rate from unemployment θ (which are increasing
in R) fall. It follows from equation (17) that an higher firing cost has overall ambiguous
effects on the level of equilibrium employment.53 Nevertheless, our numerical simulations
(see figure 1) show that the relation between firing cost and equilibrium employment is
humped-shaped: employment first decreases and then increases with the stringency of
EPL.
2. A higher value of the rent extraction power β reduces the reservation productivity, the
aggregate job destruction rate and the exit rate from unemployment.54 The reservation
productivity falls since in partial equilibrium job creation is lower when workers appro-
priate more rents; as a result, firms prefer to hold on for a longer time, i.e., R decreases
with β. The intuition is, as in Bertola (1990), that the firing cost also acts as hiring cost.
Therefore, in equilibrium cumulated profits should be large enough to cover that cost;
when β increases the firm’s flow profit is lower, so that the firm needs to stay longer in
business to cover the firing cost. The aggregate job destruction rate falls as a result of
the fact that the reservation productivity is lower (see equation (26)). The exit rate from
unemployment decreases with β, because of its direct effect and of its general equilibrium
effect (i.e., through the reservation productivity) on θ, which are both negative.
3. Higher volatility σ decreases the equilibrium reservation productivity, because in a more
turbulent environment the option value of a job is higher for the firm. The impact of
σ on the steady state aggregate rate of job destruction δ is instead ambiguous. This is
because δ decreases with σ through R, due to the negative effect that volatility has on
52In the remaining, unless stated, we keep the assumption that the exogenous job destruction rate λ is strictly
positive.
53This is a very well known and general result, first pointed out by Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and more
recently, among others, by Blanchard and Portugal (2001).
54See also Saint-Paul (1999), Proposition 2 and 3.
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the reservation productivity, and to the fact that δ increases with R. However, σ has an
ambiguous effect on δ in partial equilibrium, i.e., holding R constant.55
4. Higher volatility stimulates job creation, i.e., it raises θ. This is a consequence of the
convexity effect of volatility, which increases the value of a firm and therefore drives up
job creation.56 Notice that this is a general equilibrium effect, which dominates over the
negative partial equilibrium effect that σ has on θ due to the fact that θ increases with
R, and that R decreases in equilibrium with σ, as we already know.
5. A higher value of the drift coefficient µ increases the equilibrium reservation productivity.
This is because higher productivity growth raises both the expected output produced by
a match, and the cost of labor by increasing the value of the rent appropriated by the
employed. The second effect dominates, inducing firms to dismiss workers sooner; as a
result, R raises with µ. The impact of µ on δ is instead ambiguous, since µ has a positive
indirect effect due to the increment of R, which leads to more job destruction, but an
ambiguous direct effect on it.57 Our numerical simulations show that the effect of µ on
δ is hump-shaped: first it decreases and then it increases as the drift of the productivity
increases (figure 5). The impact of µ on θ is also ambiguous, since both the value of
output and the cost of labor are increasing in µ.
6. A higher value of λ has ambiguous effects on the reservation productivity. This is because
as the exogenous separation rate increases, firms may prefer to rely more on quits (which
are not subject to firing cost) than on dismissal, and therefore keep the worker longer. In
addition, a higher quit rate has ambiguous effects on the aggregate job destruction rate,
as the direct ambiguous effect of λ on δ comes along with the ambiguous indirect effect
through the reservation productivity. Our numerical simulations show that the effect
of λ on δ is hump-shaped: first it decreases and then it increases as the exogenous job
destruction rate increases (figure 6). Finally, job creation also depends ambiguously on λ
since a higher quit frequency has a standard negative effect on profitability, by reducing
the ex-ante value of creating a production unit. However, a higher quit rate also reduces
55Note that whenever λ  0, δ0 monotonically increases with σ in partial equilibrium, i.e., holding R constant;
however, it decreases with σ through R. Therefore, the overall effect on δ0 is also ambiguous.
56Conversely, in a matching model with endogenous separations, and where idiosyncratic uncertainty is de-
scribed by a homogenous Poisson process, a higher arrival rate of productivity shocks reduces job creation (see
for example Pissarides, 2000, p. 10).
57Note that whenever λ  0, µ has a negative direct effect on δ0 and a positive indirect effect through R.
Therefore, the overall effect on δ0 is also ambiguous.
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the expected duration of the time during which the firm makes negative profits, but it
is prevented from closing-down by the firing cost, i.e., it relaxes the actual degree of
labor market rigidity.58 On the whole, more frequent quits have therefore an interesting
ambiguous effect on equilibrium employment.
7. A higher a value of C has a direct negative effect on profitability, for given wages, by
raising the cost of creating a firm, and therefore reduces the extent of job creation.
However, a higher set-up cost C also reduces the reservation productivity (for a given
F ), and it reduces job destruction. Both of these effects are due to the fact that higher
set-up costs reduce wages (by reducing the incentives of creating jobs and therefore θ),
and they both induce firms to go on longer with a worker. The overall effect of C on
equilibrium employment is therefore ambiguous.
Proof. See appendix.
3.4 Numerical Simulations
To complete our understanding of the model, here we present a simple calibration. We choose
realistic parameters following Saint-Paul (1999), Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Nagypa´l
(2005). This calibration is meant to be a useful instrument to better understand the model
dynamics; however, it is not expected to match the real data. We consider the following set of
parameter values: µ  0.0008, σ  0.18 and λ  0.1. The unemployment utility b is set equal
to 0 since unemployment benefits do not play a particular role in this model.
In table 1, we study the effect of an increase of the firing cost F on the reservation produc-
tivity, the aggregate job destruction rate, the exit rate from unemployment and on employment,
keeping the rent extraction power constant. Both reservation productivity and aggregate de-
struction decrease with F , as well as the exit rate from unemployment. The relationship
between firing cost and employment is hump-shaped, as shown in figure 1 and in line with the
corresponding result of Bentolila and Bertola (1990). For small values of the firing cost the job
creation effect prevails and employment is lower; however, for larger values of the firing cost,
the job destruction effect is dominant and employment increases.
Table 2 shows the effect of an increase of the rent extraction power on the reservation
productivity, the exit rate from unemployment and on employment. Both the reservation pro-
58Note that this effect is absent in a framework where firms do not make losses at the separation margin, as
they do in our model.
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ductivity and the exit rate from unemployment are decreasing in β. In addition, employment,
which is a function of θ and δ,59 is also decreasing in β, as shown in figure 2.60
Table 3 shows the effect of an increase of the discounting parameter r on employment,
keeping the firing cost constant. An increase of the discounting rate implies that firms discount
more the future and therefore the discounted value of the firing cost (which is paid in the future,
from the view point of the job-creation time) is lower. This effect increases job creation, and
as a consequence employment is higher (figure 3).61
In table 4, we study the effect of an increase of the exogenous job destruction rate λ on
the equilibrium value of a firm J . Our numerical simulations indicate that in some cases the
relationship is hump-shaped: first, the value of the firm increases and then it decreases as a
function of λ (figure 4). This shows that a higher value of the quit rate can increase the value
of the firm, by reducing the expected duration of the period where the firm operates but makes
negative profits, and therefore by relaxing the effective stringency of EPL.62
Table 5 shows the effect of an increase of the drift coefficient of productivity µ on the
aggregate job destruction rate δ. While µ has a positive indirect effect through the reservation
productivity, due to the fact that as the exogenous separation rate increases firms may prefer
to keep the worker longer (by relying more on quits than on layoffs), it has an ambiguous direct
effect on it. Therefore, the overall effect of µ on δ is ambiguous. Our numerical simulations
show that the effect of µ on δ is hump-shaped: first it decreases and then it increases as the
drift coefficient of productivity increases (figure 5).
Table 6 shows the effect of an increase of the exogenous job destruction rate λ on the
aggregate job destruction rate δ. Since λ has both an ambiguous indirect effect through
the reservation productivity and an ambiguous direct effect, the overall effect of λ on δ is
ambiguous. Our numerical simulations show that the effect of λ on δ is hump-shaped: first it
decreases and then it increases as the exogenous job destruction rate increases (figure 6).
These results complete the characterization of the general economic equilibrium of the
model. The next section characterizes the general political economy equilibrium, i.e., the
general economic equilibrium with endogenous firing costs.
59As shown in Section 3.1, the steady-state expression for employment is a function of θ and δ, that is
L  θ{pδ   θq.
60Note that for low values of the firing cost F , employment is decreasing in β since the effect on the reservation
productivity dominates the effect on job creation.
61See also Bentolila and Bertola (1990), who first pointed out how the consequences of layoffs restrictions
depends on slenderest rate through the same discounting effect operating here.
62This result, again, is in contrast with the standard search and matching model, where the relationship be-
tween the exogenous job destruction rate and the value of the firm is monotonically decreasing since separations
are always jointly optimal for both partners (see Pissarides, 2000, p. 13).
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4 Politics
4.1 The Political Mechanism
We assume that a given level of the firing cost F  F0 is initially implemented, representing
the status quo level of employment protection, and that the economy is in the corresponding
stationary equilibrium. The status quo value of F may be changed as a result of a majority
voting process. We assume that voting on the firing cost takes place only once, immediately
after an unexpected shock to the exogenous variables of the model occurs, potentially affecting
the rent extraction power of the workers, and the drift and standard deviation of the Brownian
process describing the evolution of productivity, when the economy is in the politico-economic
equilibrium corresponding to F  F0.
63 The new legislated firing cost corresponds to any
point of the policy space, i.e., the interval r0, FMAXs.
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For analytical reasons, it is convenient to assume that workers vote for the effective level of
employment protection, i.e., the reservation productivity R, rather than for legal employment
protection, i.e., the level of the firing cost F . Since the bijective relation between F and R
exists according to equation (22), voting on F is equivalent to voting on the corresponding
level of R. The relevant policy space is thus the interval rRMIN , RMAXs, where we remind that
RMIN is defined as the reservation productivity corresponding to the maximum feasible level
of the firing cost FMAX , and RMAX is defined as the reservation productivity corresponding
to the minimum feasible level of the firing cost FMIN  0.
It must be emphasized at this point that if the legislated firing cost differ from F0, the
transition to the new politico-economic equilibrium is instantaneous65 for xθ, J px | R, θq,
w px | R, θq, W px | Rq, UpRqy, which are all functions of jump-variables only.66 Since the
63The assumption that voting takes place only once rules out the interesting but potentially complicated
effects that the anticipation of the future political equilibria has on the current voting decision of the workers
(see Hassler, Storesletten, Rodr´ıguez Mora and Zilibotti, 2000, and Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2011, for
examples of dynamic political games based on repeated majority voting).
64The assumption that voting takes place immediately after a shock hits the economy reflects the fact that it
is optimal for the majority of workers to vote immediately rather then to wait. This is because, if a majority of
workers is in favor of changing the status quo, it is strictly better-off by doing it as soon as possible; vice versa,
if the majority is in favor of preserving the status quo after the shock, it gains nothing by postponing voting.
65Bruegemann (2007) investigates the case in which a change in employment protection is implemented with
time delays. He shows that in countries with flexible labour markets, workers are less in favor of moving
towards an equilibrium with more stringent protection, due to the increased risk of dismissal before the actual
implementation. The difficulties in introducing protection could therefore represent an alternative explanation
for differences in employment protection across countries.
66Equation (22) implies that R depends only on F and therefore it immediately adjusts to the steady state
value corresponding to the new value of F . Equation (21) implies that θ only depends on R and therefore it
also adjusts instantaneously. Finally, the expressions of the value functions of all the workers show that the only
endogenous variables on which they depend are R and θ, which as stated above, are jump-variables. Therefore,
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welfare of all the workers jumps instantaneously to the new steady state level, in deciding how
to vote workers simply compare their value across different steady states. Instead, the state-
variables (i.e., the cross-sectional distribution of productivity, and the level of employment) do
not change instantaneously (and in particular at the instant of voting), but gradually converge
to their new steady state.
It is not possible to characterize the political equilibrium of the model using the median
voter theorem since, as we already know, the preferences of a set of positive measure of agents
do not satisfy the single-peakness (and neither the single-crossing) property. Nonetheless, we
are able to demonstrate that the social preferences over employment protection regulation
induced by majority voting do not indeed cycle, i.e., that a political equilibrium always exists.
In particular, it is possible to demonstrate that a unique Condorcet winner supported at
unanimity exists regardless on what the status quo level of the firing cost is, provided the
rent extraction power of the workers is below some threshold value. When the rent extraction
power of the workers exceeds the threshold value in question, a unique political equilibrium
still exists, but the corresponding policy is not voted at unanimity and, more importantly,
the political equilibrium can depend on the status quo level of employment protection. While
admittedly somewhat extreme, this feature of the model allows us to complete its solution
relatively simply. To make progress in the characterization of the political equilibrium, we
compute next the expressions of the value functions of all workers.
4.2 The Structure of the Preferences over Labor Market Regulation
In this subsection, we describe the preferences over employment protection regulations of all
workers. We begin by computing the values of the unemployed and of the employed workers.
Combining equations (8), (9), (10), (13) and eliminating θ in the resulting expression by using
(21), the value of unemployment UpRq can be written as
UpRq  1 β
r   λ µ

p1 βqR1α
pr   λ µqα
. (32)
Straightforward differentiation of (32) shows that the value of unemployment is strictly
increasing in R. Intuitively, unemployed workers would be strictly better-off in a fully flexible
labor market where layoffs are not constrained in any way and where therefore the exit rate
from unemployment is as high as it can be.
the value functions also adjust instantaneously.
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The value of employment W p | Rq is instead computed by combining equations (14) and
(32), and reads
W px | Rq  1 β
r   λ µ

p1 βqR1α
pr   λ µqα
 β
xR1αxα
r   λ µ
. (33)
Equation (33) allows us to determine how the welfare of employed workers depends on a
marginal increment in R.
Lemma 1 Let R  R0 denote the status quo reservation productivity. All workers employed
in firms with productivity x P px, 8q, where67
x 

βpi p1 βq1
 1
pi
, (34)
benefit strictly from a marginal increment in labor market flexibility (i.e. an infinitesimally
higher value of R), all workers in firms with productivity x P pR0, x
q are made strictly worse-
off, and all workers in firms with productivity x  x are indifferent.68
Proof. A straightforward differentiation of equation (33) shows that BW px |R q {BR » 0
for any R if x » x, and that BW px |R q {BR  0 if x  x.
Lemma 1 tells us that the workers employed by relatively productive firms (i.e., with
x ¡ x) are made better-off if the labor market becomes marginally more flexible, while the
workers employed by relatively unproductive firms are made worse-off. Intuitively, employment
protection involves some benefits, due to the extension of the duration of the rent appropriated
by the employed, but also costs, due to its adverse general equilibrium effect on job creation.
By differentiating equation (33), the total effect of a marginal increment of R on the welfare of
the workers with productivity x can be decomposed in two parts, corresponding respectively to
the marginal gain, BU pRq {BR, and to the marginal loss, proportional to BV px |R q {BR. The
gain of increasing marginally R is the same for all workers, independently of their individual
productivity, since it is due entirely to the corresponding variation of the value of unemployment
(expressed by the sum of the first two terms in (33)), which as we know is positive. Conversely,
the loss caused by more flexibility, due to the reduction of the value of the rent appropriated
by the employed (i.e., the fourth term in (33)), can be shown to be decreasing in x.69 This
result implies that relatively more productive workers lose relatively less by a relaxation of
67For convenience, we remind the reader that pi  |α| .
68If R0 ¥ x
, the interval
 
R0, x


is of course empty, in which case all employed workers are made strictly
better-off if the firing cost is relaxed infinitesimally.
69This follows from a straightforward differentiation of BV px |R q {BR with respect to x.
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the firing discipline, and explains why the workers with productivity above x are better-off
in a more flexible labor market, and vice versa.70 We remark that the threshold x does not
depend on the initial reservation productivity R0 since, as equation (33) shows, the value of
each employed worker is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in R if x  x, and it
does not depend on R if x  x.
The analysis of the equilibrium conducted so far, may suggest that all workers with pro-
ductivity below x are always harmed by more flexibility. However, this intuition is not correct
because Lemma 1 only determines how a marginal increase in labor market flexibility affects
the welfare of employed workers, as opposed to a discrete increase in R. If R increases from
R  R0 to a higher value R  R
1, i.e., if labor market flexibility increases by a non-infinitesimal
amount, then a set of jobs of non-zero measure, corresponding to the firms with productivity
in the interval rR0, R
1s, that were initially prevented from closing down by the tighter firing
restrictions, is instantaneously destroyed. It can be shown that a set of positive measure of
least productive workers exists, who are better-off if R  R1 than they are in the status quo,
despite the fact that they are fired if the reform is implemented. Intuitively, this is because
the function W  W px |R0 q is continuous in x over the range rR0, 8q.71 This means that
the welfare of the employed workers with productivity in a small right-neighborhood of R0
(i.e., with x  R0) is approximately equal to U pR0q. Moreover, voting involves the choice
between two alternatives which, for the workers with productivity x  R0 is approximately
equivalent to the choice between being unemployed in a relatively rigid (i.e., with R  R0) and
in a relatively flexible economy (i.e., with R  R1). Given that the value of the unemployed is
everywhere increasing in R, it is clear that the workers employed by firms whose idiosyncratic
productivity is sufficiently close to the status quo reservation productivity R0 will vote for a
more flexible labor market. This argument can be stated more formally as follows.
Lemma 2 In voting between the two alternatives R0 and R
1, where R1 ¡ R0, the status quo is
preferred by the employed workers with a level of idiosyncratic productivity x P px10, x
q where
x is defined by (34), and x10 is defined by equation (35). All the unemployed, and the employed
with productivity x P rR0, x
1
0q Y px
, 8q, form a coalition voting for the alternative R1.
Proof. Let x10 be the expression of the productivity level at which workers are indifferent
70This result depends on the nature of the stochastic process governing the dynamics of productivity, and in
particular on the persistence property of the geometric Brownian motion. If the realizations of x were governed
by a homogeneous Poisson process, an infinitesimal increment of R would have the same effect on the lifetime
utility of all of the employed.
71In particular, we remind that the terminal condition (12) implies the continuity of W W p |R q at x  R,
for any value of R.
28
between the two policy alternatives considered above. Letting W p |R0 q denote the value of
employment in the status quo labor market, as a function of idiosyncratic productivity, and
letting U pR1q denote the value of unemployment in the reformed labor market, the threshold
x10 is defined implicitly by the equation W px10 |R0 q  U pR1q, which can be written (using the
expression x reported in equation (34)) as
x10  pR0q
1α  x10α  pxqα  R11α  pR0q1α . (35)
Since the left-hand-side of this equation is strictly increasing in x10, and equal to zero if x
1
0 
R0, whereas its left-hand-side is strictly positive, equation (35) has always a unique solution
over the range pR0, 8q . Hence, it exists a semi-closed set of positive measure rR0, x
1
0q, such
that the workers employed in firms with productivity in this interval are strictly better-off as
unemployed in the more flexible labor market with R  R1, than as employed in the status quo
equilibrium with R  R0. We summarize the last set of results in the following lemma, which
will be used later on in the characterization of the political equilibrium level of firing cost.
A particularly important implication of the analysis leading to Lemma 2 is the existence
of a set of positive measure of workers, i.e., the employed in firms with productivity smaller
than x, whose preferences over R are not single-peaked. The value of these workers is equal
to W px |R q for any R such that RMIN ¤ R ¤ x and, by Lemma 1, it is strictly decreasing in
R over the same range. However, the value of the same workers is equal to U pR | Rq (since
they are fired) for any R such that x ¤ R ¤ 1, which as we know is strictly increasing in
R, i.e., their preferences have two peaks. The presence of a set of positive measure of agents
with non single-peaked preferences in the policy variable implies the violation of one of the
assumptions of the median voter theorem, which therefore can not be applied to solve for the
political equilibrium of the model.
5 Political Equilibria
With no loss of generality, we will henceforth assume for analytical convenience that set-
up costs, which are exogenous, are normalized to zero; therefore RMAX pFMIN  0q  1.
Also, before proceeding to characterize the political equilibria of the model, we introduce the
following pair of definitions.
Definition 1 R  R is a political equilibrium conditional on the status quo, if it defeats any
other alternative in pairwise comparisons conditionally on R  R0.
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Definition 2 R  R is an unconditional political equilibrium, if it defeats any other alter-
native in pairwise comparisons regardless on the status quo value of R.
We also define the threshold βˆ as the unique value of β such that x pβq is equal to the
initial productivity x  1,72 or
βˆ 
1
1  pi
. (36)
Proposition 3 If β ¤ βˆ, where βˆ is defined by (36), then the unique unconditional political
equilibrium of the model involves setting R  1, and this choice is preferred at unanimity to
any alternative.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 tells us that as long as the rent extraction power of the employed is relatively
low, a fully flexible labor market is politically stable, in the sense that workers prefer it at
unanimity to any possible alternative, whatever the status quo is. The intuition for this
result is that when the rents appropriated by the employed are small enough, workers have
little reason to protect them by demanding any job security provisions, since the costs of
employment protection are larger than the corresponding gains for any positive value of F .
To complete the characterization of the political equilibrium, let us define x¯ as the produc-
tivity level such that a worker is indifferent between being employed in the most rigid economy,
i.e., where R  RMIN  R pFMAXq, in a firm with idiosyncratic productivity equal to x¯, and
unemployed in the most flexible economy possible, i.e., where R  RMAX  R pFMIN  0q  1.
Formally, x¯ is defined implicitly by equation (35), setting R0  RMIN and RMAX  1 (see
above). Finally, let λΨ tu indicate the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure induced by the stationary
distribution of productivity across active firms Ψλ pq, characterized by Proposition 1, for any
given initial level of job security provisions.73
Proposition 4 Suppose that β ¡ βˆ, where βˆ is defined by expression (36). We have that:
1. If R0   x¯, then R  RMIN is the unique conditional political equilibrium if
λΨ tpx¯, x
quL ¥
1
2
, (37)
72Since x pq is strictly increasing in β and onto p0, 1q, the equation in question has always a unique solution.
73There is no confusion between “λ” defined as the arrival rate of the exogenous quit shock, and “λΨ tAu”
indicating the measure of any Borel set A P B prR0, 8qq. Moreover, the density of the stationary distribution
(28) is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesque measure. As a direct consequence, single points are null set for
λΨ and, in particular the measure does not distinguish open and closed sets.
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where L denotes the level of employment corresponding to the initial level of labor market
rigidity. Vice versa, R  RMAX  1 is the unique conditional political equilibrium if the
reverse of condition (37) holds.
2. If R0 ¥ x¯, then R  RMIN is the unique conditional political equilibrium if
λΨ tpR0, x
quL ¥
1
2
. (38)
Vice versa, R  RMAX  1 is the unique political equilibrium if the reverse of condition
(38) holds.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 4 describes the basic structure of the political equilibrium, which has the
following characteristics. First, according to Proposition 4 the political equilibrium always
exists, and it involves either the choice of an unregulated labor market (i.e., R  1) or of
the most rigid labor market possible (i.e., R  RMIN ). Second, according to Proposition 4,
labor market rigidity is supported by the workers who are employed in firms which have an
intermediate level of idiosyncratic productivity when voting occurs. Vice versa, flexibility is
supported by an extreme coalition made up by the workers employed by the more and by the
less productive firms, and also by all the unemployed.74
Remark 4 If β  βˆ, equation (35) implies that x  x¯  1. Since x¯ is decreasing in β, and
x is increasing β and equal to 1 when β  βˆ , we have that x¯   x and R0   x
 for any β
greater than βˆ. It follows that the sets of workers in favor of a rigid labor market defined in
two cases of Proposition 4 are both non-empty.
5.1 Some Comparative Statics Properties of the Political Equilibrium
In this subsection, we characterize how some endogenous elements of the equilibrium of the
model, i.e., the thresholds x, x¯ and βˆ, are affected by the key exogenous parameters.
We begin by observing that the threshold value x depends directly on the rent extraction
power of the employed β and indirectly (i.e., through pi) on the drift µ and on the instantaneous
standard deviation σ. In particular, it can be shown with a straightforward differentiation of
equation (34) that x is strictly increasing in β. This result is not surprising since employment
74As the coalition of low and high productive individuals becomes larger, economies having initially a very
high firing cost, which allows the survival of low-productivity jobs and generates a highly dispersed productivity
distribution, will tend to support reforms increasing the flexibility of the labor market.
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protection is attractive for the employed only if the rents that they capture, which are pro-
portional to β, are large enough to compensate for the general equilibrium distortions caused
by the firing cost, i.e., for the reverse of the job creation effect on their utility. Perhaps more
surprisingly, we also find that how x is affected by the other two parameters of interest, i.e.,
σ and µ, depends on the rent extraction power of the employed in the sense explained by the
following lemma.
Lemma 3 Higher volatility and lower growth both increase the threshold x defined in (34)
if β P pβ, 1q where β  e{ pe  piq, where “e” denotes Euler’s number. Higher volatility and
lower growth both decrease x if β P p0, βq, and do not affect x if β  β.
Proof. It follows from the differentiation of expression (34).
In words, when the power of rent extraction of employed workers is relatively high, i.e.,
if β ¡ β, more volatility increases the productivity x of the marginal worker, as defined in
Lemma 1, and vice versa; intuitively, this result is due to the following reason. In a more
volatile economy, both the positive impact of higher labor market flexibility on the utility
of the employed through the job creation effect, and its negative impact through the rent
erosion effect are magnified, reflecting the existence of a complementarity between flexibility
and volatility.
Which of these two opposite forces dominates over the other depends on β. If β ¡ β,
the rent is a relatively important component of the welfare of the employed, and therefore the
magnification of the utility loss due to the rent erosion effect dominates over the magnification
of the utility gain due to the job creation effect. As a result, the threshold x expressing the
productivity of the marginal worker has to increase in order to ensure a greater insulation
from the risk of job destruction of the pivotal worker.75 The opposite happens if the power of
rent extraction of the employed is relatively small, i.e., if β   β, and as a result the critical
productivity level x falls.76
75We remind that, because the paths of a Brownian process are (almost surely) continuous, the current
productivity level of a firm exhibits some degree of persistence in the future. Therefore, the matches that are
relatively productive in the present are exposed to a lower risk of destruction in the future, all else equal. This
is reflected in fact that, as already remarked, the rent of the employed decreases less with R the greater is x,
i.e., the cross-partial derivative of V with respect to x and R is strictly positive.
76Our numerical simulations (available from the authors upon request) show that, consistently with the theory,
the welfare of the unemployed is positively affected by the interaction of higher volatility of output growth and
lower firing cost. This effect is stronger whenever the firing cost is low because the magnification effect of job
creation due to higher uncertainty, is stronger in a relatively flexible economy. In addition, for low values of β,
i.e., β   β, the job creation effect prevails on the rent erosion effect and therefore the welfare of the employed
increases as a consequence of higher volatility of the rate of output growth and lower firing cost. However, for
32
Similarly, it is possible to verify that lower productivity growth increases both the marginal
gain, through the job creation effect, and the marginal loss, through the rent erosion effect,
caused by more flexibility. When β is relatively high, the magnification of the marginal loss
dominates, and therefore x must increase relative to its initial value in order to make the
marginal worker more insulated from the risk of job destruction, reducing its marginal loss
from more flexibility. The converse is true if β is relatively low, in which case the threshold x
must decrease.
The next lemma clarifies how the second productivity threshold x¯ mentioned in Proposition
4 is affected by the parameters of interest.
Lemma 4 The productivity level x¯ defined in (35) with R0  RMIN and R
1  1 increases
with σ and decreases with β and µ.
Proof. See appendix.
It is not surprising that x¯ decreases with β since being an insider becomes more valuable
when rents are higher, and this creates more political support for job security provisions among
the employed. Higher volatility σ has qualitatively the opposite effect of β on x¯, because in
a more volatile environment the risk of a critical fall of productivity down to the absorbing
barrier R is higher. As a result, the least productive workers expect to earn less rents, for
any given level of the firing cost; this effects erodes the political support for rigidity at the
bottom of the distribution of productivity, i.e., x¯ increases. Finally, a higher value of the
drift coefficient µ is found to reduce x¯. Intuitively, a higher value of µ means that employed
workers, for any level of current idiosyncratic productivity, expect to become relatively more
productive in the future. In particular, a higher value of µ induces the workers employed at the
moment of voting in low productivity firms to become relatively more “optimistic” about their
future productivity, and therefore about the future amount of rents that they can appropriate
of, conditionally on remaining employed. The greater optimism makes these workers more
reluctant to give up their position of insiders by voting in favor of low job security provisions.
Finally, Lemma 5 clarifies how the threshold value βˆ depends on the parameters governing
the dynamics of productivity.
Lemma 5 The threshold βˆ defined by equation (36) increases with σ and it decreases with µ.
high values of β, i.e., β ¡ β, the opposite is true: the rent erosion effect dominates and therefore the welfare
of the employed decreases as a consequence of higher volatility of output growth and lower EPL.
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Proof. Straightforward differentiation of equation (36) using the fact that pi  |α| ¡ 0
and the expression of α reported in equation (52) in the appendix.
Lemma 5 has the implication that it is more likely to obtain an equilibrium with unanimous
political support for full flexibility (i.e., R  1) in a more volatile economic environment and in
presence of lower productivity growth. Intuitively this is because, as we already know (Lemma
3), if workers appropriate of relatively low rents, i.e., if β is below β, the magnification of the
job creation effect due to higher flexibility dominates over the magnification of the rent erosion
effect, i.e., the marginal utility gain from higher flexibility for employed workers increases
relative to the marginal utility loss. As a result, the political support for flexibility increases;
since βˆ  p1  piq1   β  e pe  piq1, this is the case around βˆ and therefore βˆ increases.
Following the same logic, if productivity growth is higher, the existence of unanimous support
for full flexibility is less likely to emerge in the low rents zone.
6 On The Rise and Persistence of Eurosclerosis
In this section, we use the set of results demonstrated in Section 5 to investigate how unexpected
shocks to the main parameters of the model, i.e., β, σ and µ, affect the political equilibrium of
the model characterized in Proposition 4. In particular, the goal of this section is to shed some
new light on the major stylized facts on the comparative dynamics of labor market institutions
in the U.S. and in Europe over the last few decades, briefly reviewed in the introduction of the
paper. Before continuing, we remind that a useful property of the model (previously remarked)
is that the value functions of all workers only depend on jump-variables, i.e., workers make
their voting decisions “comparing steady states.” Moreover, because the state-variables of the
model, i.e., the level of employment and the cross-sectional distribution of productivity, are not
affected by an exogenous shock on impact, and because voting takes place immediately after
the realization of the shock occurs, this affects voting decisions and the political equilibrium
of the model through the jump-variables only.77
6.1 The Breakdown of a Flexible Economy
It has been widely remarked that the divergence of the labor market institutions of Continental
Europe and of the U.S. has begun in the aftermath of the major negative macroeconomic
77The interaction between shocks and institutions has been first highlighted by Blanchard and Summers
(1987) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
34
shocks, increasing volatility and reducing productivity growth, occurred during the 1970’s.78
The model presented in this paper can shed some light on this fact since it implies that
institutional divergence can occur if the same negative shock hits economies which are relatively
flexible to begin with, but which differ in terms of the ability of labor to appropriate rents.
According to Proposition 4, in a relatively flexible economy (i.e., with R0 ¥ x¯) a transition
to a rigid labor market is favored by the employed workers with productivity in the interval
pR0, x
q, which has measure induced by Ψλ pxq equal to
λΨ tpR0, x
quL  rΨλ px
q Ψλ pR0qsL, (39)
where we remind that L is the level of employment in the equilibrium obtaining with the
initial level of the firing cost. Expression (39) defines the size of the coalition for rigidity,
which depends on β, σ and µ, and also on the status quo level of employment protection
regulation R0. Since we assume that workers vote directly on the reservation productivity,
neither the level of employment nor the distribution of productivity are immediately affected
by the shock, which changes instantaneously only the productivity cutoff x. In particular,
as we already know, x increases in β, which means that if labor becomes stronger, as it has
been the case in many Continental European countries since the late 1960’s (e.g., Caballero
and Hammour, 1998), more workers find themselves employed in firms with productivity in the
range pR0, x
q. As a result, the size of the coalition for rigidity increases with the bargaining
power of the employed, reflecting the resulting greater scope for rent appropriation available
to the insiders. Moreover, according to Lemma 3, how the size of the coalition for rigidity is
affected by a shock to σ and µ also depends on the value of β. In particular, in an economy
where labor appropriates of relatively high rents, i.e., where β ¡ β, the threshold productivity
level x increases as volatility increases and as productivity growth slows down, i.e., as “bad
times” come; the opposite is true in a relatively low rents economy, i.e., where β   β.
Since the threshold x is the only element of (39) affected by the economic shock in question,
we conclude that bad business conditions, such as those experienced by most industrialized
economies during the 1970’s, increase the political support for the transition to a more rigid
labor market in high rents economies, such as those of Continental Europe. However, the
same type of shock does not make labor market rigidity more appealing politically in low rents
economies, such as the U.S., where the size of the coalition for rigidity actually shrinks. As
we already know, this result depends on the complementarity existing between volatility and
78See for example Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and Comin and Philippon (2005) for evidence of increased
earnings and output volatility since the 1970’s.
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flexibility and on the substitutability existing between growth and flexibility, which imply that
greater volatility and lower productivity growth boost at the same time the job creation effect
and the rent erosion effect of flexibility. It follows that employed workers demand an higher
firing cost only if the composition of these two opposite effects is such that the marginal gain
in utility from flexibility decreases relative to the corresponding marginal loss, which is the
case if the rent is a relatively important component of their welfare.
Finally, how the status quo level of employment protection regulation affects the size of the
coalition of employed workers in favor of the transition to a more rigid labor market can be
determined by differentiating expression (39) with respect to R0. Using the expression of the
ergodic cross-sectional distribution of productivity across employment, reported in equation
(77) in the appendix of the paper, it is possible to show that the measure of the set pR0, x
q
decreases with R0, i.e., the size of a coalition in favor of adopting more stringent job security
provisions is larger in an economy that is initially relatively more rigid. This result also concurs
in explaining the institutional divergence of European and American labor markets during the
1970’s, since it has been documented (e.g., Blanchard, 2000) that Continental Europe was
already somewhat more rigid than the U.S. at the beginning of that period.
6.2 Good Times and Labor Market Reforms
At the present moment, the political debate over labor market institutions in Continental
Europe is centered around the elimination of part of their rigidity. According to Bean (1998),
the macroeconomic environment strongly affects the incentives for, and the feasibility of, labour
market reforms. In particular, a boom, i.e., “good times”, is the ideal time to undertake such
reforms for two main reasons. First of all, the opposition to the reforms will be less strong,
whilst budgetary constraints will be less likely to constrain expenditures. Furthermore, if such
reforms are successful, they will allow the boom to continue longer.
Our model, which focuses on the political support for labor market deregulation from work-
ers with different levels of productivity, implies that a simple relation between macroeconomic
well-being and the political feasibility of labor market reforms increasing flexibility need not
exist. Intuitively, this is because if economic conditions improve for all workers, e.g., if pro-
ductivity grows at a higher rate, the value of the rent appropriated by the employed increases,
making the least productive workers more willing to support high job security provisions shel-
tering them from the job destruction process.
To determine how a change in the rent extraction power of the employed, and a positive
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productivity shock hitting a relatively rigid economy, i.e., with R0   x¯, affect the political
equilibrium, we begin by observing that according to Proposition 4 a reform consisting in in-
creasing labor market flexibility is supported by all the unemployed. In addition, the coalition
for flexibility incudes the employed with productivity in the upper and lower tail of the dis-
tribution, i.e., with x P rR0, x¯q and with x P px
, 8q. A higher value of β decreases without
ambiguity the size of the coalition for reforms since x is strictly increasing, and x¯ is strictly
decreasing in β, reflecting that preserving a rigid status quo is more appealing for employed
workers when they can extract more rents from firms. To determine what effect µ has on
the two threshold levels of productivity x and x¯, we need to distinguish between the two
different cases contemplated by Lemma 3, corresponding to values of β smaller or greater than
the threshold β. The case of β ¡ β is more relevant here since it reflects the high-rents
economies of Continental Europe. If β ¡ β Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that the effect of µ on x
is such that Bx{Bµ   0, and its effect on x¯ is such that Bx¯{Bµ   0.
What can the model tell us about how more favorable macroeconomic conditions affect
the political viability of reforms of European labor markets? Unfortunately, not a clear-cut
message. This is because, as remarked above, the two thresholds x and x¯ defining the coalition
for rigidity tend to move in the same direction, i.e., they both decrease if µ increases. In
particular, the measure of the set px, 8q of most productive employed workers who stand
for flexibility, or
λΨ tpx
, 8quL  r1Ψλ px
qsL,
increases as x decreases. However, the same type of shock also tends to cut down the polit-
ical support for flexibility among the workers located at the lower tail of the distribution of
productivity, i.e., the set pR0, x¯q with measure
λΨ tpR0, x¯quL  rΨλ px¯q Ψλ pR0qsL,
by moving out of it some workers with productivity below the lower bound x¯. Intuitively, this
is because good economic conditions boost the rents that employed workers can potentially
obtain, and therefore make some of them more reluctant to give up their position of insiders.
As a result, whether the extent of the political support for rigidity among the workers with
intermediate productivity, i.e., the measure of the set px¯, xq, increases or decreases cannot be
established a priori. This result is particularly important since it implies that the way labor
market institutions evolve in response to a worsening and to an improvement of aggregate
business conditions respectively may be strikingly asymmetric. In particular, whereas a bad
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economic shock may cause the breakdown of a relatively flexible economy, a good shock hitting
a rigid high-rents economy need not have the effect of triggering the opposite transition to
a more flexible labor market. This result is broadly consistent with, and provides a novel
explanation for the dynamics of labor market institutions observed in Continental Europe in
the recent years, which have shown little tendency to revert to flexibility, long after the original
negative shocks favoring the build-up of Eurosclerosis have vanished.79
We conclude this section by remarking that our results question to some degree the validity
of the argument that good times are necessarily good also for reforms. Cutting down the rents
appropriated by the employed, i.e., reducing the value of β, is an important pre-requisite of a
potentially successful reform of a rigid labor market. However, favorable economic shocks do
not have clear-cut consequences for the political feasibility of a reform aimed at making a rigid
labor market more flexible.
7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to explain the diverging comparative dynamics of one labor mar-
ket institution, employment protection legislation, in Europe and in the U.S. over the last
few decades. At the methodological level, the paper represents an innovation to the existing
literature, since the model presented relies on the novel assumption that the dynamics of pro-
ductivity is described by a Geometric Brownian process (whose dynamics features some degree
of persistence) and an homogenous Poisson process rather than, as usually assumed, solely by
an homogenous Poisson process (which has instead no memory, as new productivity levels are
drawn from an exogenous distribution and are independent on current productivity levels).
This assumption is important since it implies that the preferences on employment protection
legislation of the workers are potential affected by their own idiosyncratic productivity at the
moment of voting. This is because relatively more productive workers gain relatively little from
a more stringent regulation of dismissals, due to the persistence of their current productivity
implied by the continuity of the paths of the Brownian motion. Within this novel framework,
a key substantive result demonstrated is the broad importance of the rents that employed
workers are able to extract from firms. The capacity of labor to appropriate rents and labor
79It must be emphasized that the persistence of high levels of rent extraction power on the part of employed
workers, is important according to our model to explain the lack of reversibility displayed by Continental
European labor market institutions. This is documented empirically by Saint-Paul (2004), who finds no evidence
of a decline in the rents of employed workers in Europe during the 1990’s, with the exception of Ireland. See also
Mo¨ller and Aldashev (2005), who document that employed workers have been able to appropriate of persistently
higher rents in Germany than in the U.S., since the early 1980’s.
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turnover regulations have appeared to be closely linked as part of rigid politico-economic equi-
libria. This result is intuitive since if rents are low, there is clearly little scope to demand their
protection with stringent job security provisions. Moreover, and perhaps more surprisingly,
how labor market institutions are affected by economic shocks, has also been found to depend
on the extent of the rents appropriated by labor, as well as on the status quo level of the firing
cost.
The results provided by the analysis of the political equilibrium of the model, have then
been used to demonstrate that the different ability of labor to extract rents, can explain the
diverging pattern of institutional evolution experienced by Continental Europe and by the
U.S., in response to the similar major negative shocks experienced during the 1970’s on both
sides of the Atlantic. In addition, a novel potential explanation has been provided of why the
institutional rigidity typical of Continental European labor markets, which emerged quite a
long time ago, has largely persisted (with some qualifications such as short-term employment
contracts) up to the present day, long after the major shocks originally favoring its creation
have vanished. More generally, an important implication of our model is that once stringent
job security provisions are put in place, they have the potential to be persistent across different
economic conditions, i.e., there exists a potential scope for hysteresis and path dependency in
labor market institutions.
8 Appendix
In the following, we shall refer to two regions defined implicitly by the variational inequality
(5): the continuation region C where rJ px | R, θq  x  w px | R, θq   E pdJ q {dt  λJ , and
the stopping region S  C¯ where J px | R, θq  F . Moreover, we remark that the set-up cost
C is an additive term in the value function J , therefore we can perform all computations first
assuming C  0, and then adding the real hiring cost.
8.1 Derivation of the Expected PDV of Output
The integral in (10) can be broken down recursively to obtain the following recursion, satisfied
by the functional V p | Rq over the region C of productivity levels such that firms continue
operating,
rV px | Rq  x 
1
dt
E pdV q  λV px | Rq . (40)
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Using the Feynman-Kac representation, we find that the second order differential equation
satisfied by V p | Rq over the continuation region C reads
1
2
σ2x2V 2 px | Rq   µxV 1 px | Rq  pr   λqV px | Rq   x  0. (41)
The general integral of this equation is represented by
V px | Rq 
x
r   λ µ
 D1x
ν  D2x
α, (42)
where ν and α denote respectively the positive and negative root of the relevant characteris-
tic polynomial associated with (41), identical to the corresponding characteristic polynomial 
σ22{2

  µ r  λ

associated with (49). The expression of equation (14) follows from
(42), excluding the positive root ν by setting D1  0 in (42) for the standard reason (e.g.,
Dixit, 1993, p. 25), i.e., to prevent the fundamental of the asset to become negligible relatively
to its option value as x Ò  8, and taking into account the boundary condition V pR | Rq.
Refer to equation (51) below for the explicit expression of D2.
8.2 Derivation of the Wage Schedule
Combining equations (9), (10), and setting x  1 (the initial productivity of a new firm), the
flow-value of unemployment can be expressed as
rUpR, θq  b  θβV p1 | Rq . (43)
Substituting forW px | R, θq using terminal relation defined by (12), and using the fact, implied
by (10), that E pdWq {dt  βE pdV q {dt, the recursion (8) can be written as
pr   λq rUpR, θq   βV px | Rqs  w px | R, θq   β 1
dt
E pdV q   λUpR, θq. (44)
Also, by combining equations (43) and (44), we obtain that
w px | R, θq  b  θβV p1 | Rq   pr   λqβV px | Rq  β
1
dt
E pdV q . (45)
Finally, substituting in this equation the expression of V px | Rq provided by (40), (45) can be
written as the expression reported in equation (13).
8.3 Solution of the Optimal Stopping Problem of the Firms
Firms face a standard problem of optimal stopping in continuous time, which is formalized by
the Bellman-Wald equation (5). It is well known that the solution of this class of problems (e.g.,
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Dixit, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Peskir and Shiryaev, 2006; Stokey, 2008) is characterized
in terms of a productivity threshold R, such that the continuation value of the asset exceeds
the value of the asset-upon stopping as long as x ¡ R and is exceeded by it if x   R, with the
two values matching at x  R. The optimal stopping rule of the firm is to continue producing
as long as x remains above R, and to close down, firing the workers and paying the associated
layoff cost F , as soon as the absorbing barrier R is first reached. On the continuation region
tx P R  : x ¡ Ru, therefore, the functional equation (5) corresponds to the equation
pr   λqJ px | R, θq  x w px | R, θq  
1
dt
E pdJ q , (46)
while at the absorbing barrier R, the following value matching (or continuous fit) condition
J pR | R, θq  F (47)
must hold, establishing the continuity of the value function J p | R, θq upon stopping. A
second functional relation, the smooth pasting (or smooth fit) condition, must also hold for
the stopping rule to be optimal. This condition states that the value function is differentiable
with continuity along the curve separating the continuation region from the stopping region.
Here, the continuation value of the firm upon stopping is equal to F , and therefore the
smooth pasting condition implies that
J 1 pR | R, θq  0. (48)
Equation (46) is interpreted as a second order ordinary differential equation in the unknown
function J p | R, θq, i.e., an Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. This allows us to transform
the optimal stopping problem of the firm into a free-boundary problem (or Stefan’s prob-
lem), with mixed boundary conditions.80 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation satisfied by
J p | R, θq over the continuation region reads81
1
2
σ2x2J2 px | R, θq   µxJ 1 px | R, θq  pr   λqJ px | R, θq   x w px | R, θq  0. (49)
80Free-boundary problems are a speical class of boundary value problems arising in the theory of partial
differential equantions (e.g., Brown and Churchill, 2012).
81The first two terms of the RHS of equation (49) correspond to the Dynkin operator D associated with the
diffusion process described by the stochastic differential equation (2) of the optimization problem of the firm,
whose variational formulation reads
min rDJ   λJ   rJ  px wq,J   F s  0.
For a complete characterization, we can show that the previous variational inequality has a unique viscosity
solution, (e.g. Crandall, Ishii, and Lions, 2009). Moreover, this viscosity solution is regular, and therefore it is
a classical solution. In particular, we can show that this solution is of class C1 on the domain and C2 inside
the continuation region C.
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Using the expression of the wage rate w pxq reported in (13), the general integral of this equation
is found to be of the type
J px | R, θq 
p1 βqx
r   λ µ

b  θβV p1 | Rq
r   λ
 D1x
%  D2x
α,
with D1 and D2 standing for constants to be determined, and with % and α standing for the
positive and for the negative root of the characteristic polynomial
σ2
2
 p 1q   µ pr   λq (50)
associated with (49). By a standard argument (e.g., Dixit, 1993, p. 25), the root % must be
eliminated by setting the constant D1 equal to zero. This is because otherwise the fundamental
of the asset would become negligible, relatively to its option value, as x Ò  8.82 The value of
D2 is instead determined through the smooth pasting condition, which implies that
D2pRq  
p1 βqR1α
pr   λ µqα
. (51)
The expression of equation (15) then follows. Moreover, since the negative root α of (50) reads
α 
1
σ2
"
σ2
2
 µ
1
2
a
rpσ2  2µq2   8σ2pr   λqs
*
, (52)
it can be verified with straightforward algebra that
Bα
Bσ
¡ 0 and
Bα
Bµ
  0 and
Bα
Bλ
  0. (53)
Finally, the endogenous absorbing barrier R is compute using equation (50), setting as already
remarked D1  0, together with the boundary condition J px | R, θq  F .
8.4 Proof of Proposition 1
The strategy of the proof consists in first looking at the special case where λ  0, and then
generalizing the results obtained to the case of λ ¡ 0.
8.4.1 Preliminary Results for the Special Case λ  0: Job Destruction Rate and
Ergodic Distribution
In order to describe the evolution of the productivity of a firm it is convenient to consider, rather
than the original process x, the transformed process z  ln pxq . It is known (e.g., Dixit, 1993)
that, since x represents a Geometric Brownian process with drift µ and instantaneous standard
82From a mathematical point of view, we can show that the viscosity solution is controlled by a strict super-
solution of affine type (see Pham, 2009, ch. 4) thanks to a verification theorem. As a consequence D1  0.
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deviation σ, z is a linear Brownian process with mean η 

µ
 
σ2{2

, and instantaneous
standard deviation σ. Notice that, because the initial value of x is normalized to one, the
initial value of z is equal to zero. Moreover, the drift η of the transformed process is negative,
since µ   σ2{2 by assumption.
Next, focusing the attention with no loss of generality on a firm created at time s  0, define
p pz0, z; tq as the probability density function of z, conditional on the fact that the process z
has never reached the barrier Rˆ  ln pRq within the time interval p0, tq, starting at z p0q  z0.
We can write the conditional distribution function corresponding to the density p pz0, z; tq as
P
!
z ptq ¡ z | z pτq ¡ Rˆ , @ τ P p0, tq
)

»  8
z
p pz0, ζ; tq dζ  P pz0, z; tq . (54)
Using this expression, we can write the probability that the process z has not yet been absorbed
at Rˆ up to time t, as P

z0, Rˆ; t
	
. Moreover, defining T¯

Rˆ
	
as the random time elapsed since
the creation of the firm in question, at which the process describing the evolution of the (log
of) its productivity first reaches the barrier Rˆ, we obviously have that
P
!
T¯

Rˆ
	
¡ t
)
 P

z0, Rˆ; t
	
. (55)
Since our objective is to compute the probability distribution of a first passage time of a Brow-
nian motion, it is natural to look at the Kolmogorov backward partial differential equation
satisfied by its transition density. It is known (e.g., Cox and Miller, 1965, ch. 5) that the func-
tion P

z0, Rˆ; t
	
satisfies the Kolmogorov backward partial differential equation, and therefore
we can write that
1
2
σ2
BP
Bz20

z0, Rˆ; t
	
  η
BP
Bz0

z0, Rˆ; t
	

BP
Bt

z0, Rˆ; t
	
, (56)
given the pair of boundary conditions
P

Rˆ, Rˆ; t
	
 0 and limz0Ñ 8P

z0, Rˆ; t
	
 1. (57)
The first boundary condition reflects the fact that absorption immediately occurs if z0  Rˆ,
and the second boundary condition reflects the fact that absorption occurs with probability
zero in a finite time, if the process z starts at an initial position infinitely distant from the
barrier. For our purpose, it is convenient to solve the boundary value problem represented
by (56) and (57) with the Laplace transform method. Let L

; z0, Rˆ
	
indicate the Laplace
transform of P

z0, Rˆ; t
	
, defined as
L

ρ; z0, Rˆ
	

»  8
0
eρtP

z0, Rˆ; t
	
dt. (58)
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By transforming both sides of equation (56) using the theorem of differentiation of the original,
and the fact that at the moment of creation, the probability that the productivity of a firm is
equal to R is zero, i.e.,
P

z0, Rˆ; 0
	
 1,
it can be shown that L

ρ; , Rˆ
	
satisfies the following second order ordinary differential equa-
tion
1
2
σ2
d2L
dz20

ρ; z0, Rˆ
	
  η
dL
dz0

ρ; z0, Rˆ
	
 ρL

ρ; z0, Rˆ
	
 1, (59)
subject to the pair of transformed boundary conditions
L

ρ; Rˆ, Rˆ
	
 0 and limz0Ñ 8L

ρ; z0, Rˆ
	

1
ρ
. (60)
Letting, ϑ pρq 

η 
a
η2   2σ2ρ

{σ2, denote the negative root of the characteristic poly-
nomial
 
σ22{2

  η ρ

associated with (59), as a function of ρ, the solution of equation
(59) subject to (60), is found to be
L

ρ; z0, Rˆ
	

1
ρ

1 eϑpρqpz0Rˆq

. (61)
Since η   0, and since z0  0, the following pair of equalities holds
L

0; 0, Rˆ
	
 lim
ρÑ0
1
ρ

1 eϑpρqRˆ


Rˆ
η
, (62)
where the second equality follows by applying de l’Hospital’s theorem to compute the limit.
Finally, using (62), and the fact that (55) and (58) imply that
L

0; 0, Rˆ
	

»  8
0
P tT pRq ¡ tu dt, (63)
the steady state rate of aggregate job destruction δ0 when λ  0, characterized by (27), can
be expressed as
δ0 
1
L

0; 0, Rˆ
	  1
Rˆ 

σ2
2
 µ


,
which corresponds to the expression reported in (27). To complete the proof of Proposition
1, we need to characterize the ergodic cross-sectional distribution of productivity across active
firms. Using again the transformation z  ln pxq, we can write the steady state cross-sectional
distribution of z across employment as
Ψ˜ pzq  P tZ ¤ zu  1 P tZ ¡ zu . (64)
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Also, using the expression of the transition density of z conditional on non-absorption defined
in (54), we can write that, in the ergodic steady state of the model
P tZ ¡ zu 
θ p1 Lq
L
» t
8
»  8
z
p pz0, ζ; t sq dζ

ds.
This expression corresponds to the integral sum of the number of firms created since the
infinitely remote past, which have survived up to time t and have productivity at t greater
than z, weighted by the steady state level of employment. Next, using the expression of δ
derived above and reported in (27), the fact that equation (17) implies that θ p1 Lq {L  δ,
and changing variables, we can also write P tZ ¡ zu as
P tZ ¡ zu 
η
Rˆ
»  8
0
P pz0, z; tq dt, (65)
where P pz0, z; tq is defined as in (54). Using (65) we can then write (64) as
Ψ˜ pzq  1
η
Rˆ
»  8
0
P pz0, z; tq dt. (66)
To make progress in characterizing Ψ˜ pq, we consider the Kolmogorov backward differential
equation satisfied by P pz0, z; tq, which is equivalent to equation (56), together with the pair
of boundary conditions, which have the usual interpretation,
P

Rˆ, z; t
	
 0 and limz0Ñ 8P pz0, z; tq  1. (67)
It is again convenient to solve the backward equation (56) subject to (67), with the Laplace
transform method. Defining the Laplace transform of the function P pz0, z; tq as
L pρ; z0, zq 
»  8
0
eρtP pz0, z; tq dt, (68)
the expression of Ψ˜ pq can be directly obtained by computing the limit of L pρ; z0, zq as ρ Ó 0.
To compute the expression of the Laplace transform (68), we begin by transforming equation
(56) in the following pair of second order ordinary differential equations,#
1
2
σ2 d
2L
dz20
pρ; z0, zq   η
dL
dz0
pρ; z0, zq  ρL pρ; z0, zq  1, if z0 ¡ z;
1
2
σ2 d
2L
dz20
pρ; z0, zq   η
dL
dz0
pρ; z0, zq  ρL pρ; z0, zq , if z0 ¤ z,
where L  L pρ; z0, zq, along with the pair of transformed boundary conditions obtained from
(67)
L

ρ; Rˆ, z
	
 0, and lim z0Ñ 8L pρ; z0, zq 
1
ρ
. (69)
45
Some tedious but simple algebra83 implies that the solution to (8.4.1) and (8.4.1) subject to
(69) is
L pρ; z0, zq  φ2
ρ
eφ1pRˆzq
eφ1pz0Rˆq  eφ2pz0Rˆq
φ2  φ1
, if z0 ¤ z, (70)
L pρ; z0, zq  φ2
ρ
eφ1pRˆzq
eφ1pz0Rˆq  eφ2pz0Rˆq
φ2  φ1
 
1
ρ

1
φ2e
φ1pz0zq  φ1e
φ2pz0zq
φ2  φ1
ff
, if z0 ¡ z,
(71)
where we have used the definitions
φ1  
η
σ2
 
c
η2
σ4
 
2λ
σ2
and φ2  
η
σ2

c
η2
σ4
 
2λ
σ2
. (72)
8.4.2 The General Case λ ¡ 0 : Job Destruction Rate and Ergodic Distribution
Let pλpz0, z; tq be the density of the process z  ln pxq conditional on the fact that the exogenous
time Tλ is after t and on the fact that z has never hit the barrier Rˆ over the interval r0, ts. We
then define
Pλpz0, z; tq  P
"
Z ¡ z and Tλ ¡ t | inf
sPr0,ts
Zs ¡ Rˆ
*
 P
"
Z ¡ z | inf
sPr0,ts
zs ¡ Rˆ
*
 P tTλ ¡ tu

»  8
z
pλpz0, ζ; tqdζ 
»  8
z
p0pz0, ζ; tqe
λtdζ  P0pz0, z; tqe
λt,
where the fourth equality comes from the independence of Tλ with respect to the filtration
Ft  σ tWs : s ¤ tu generated by W and using the properties of the exponential law of Tλ.
We then have the following factorization for Pλpz0, z; tq into the two marginal distribution
functions forming it, or
Pλpz0, z; tq  P0pz0, z; tqe
λt. (73)
The inverse cumulative distribution of productivity can be computed using the theorem of
Fubini, and reads
Ψλpzq  P tZt ¡ zu  δ
» t
8
»  8
z
pλpz0, ζ; t sqdζds  δ
»  8
0
Pλpz0, z; tqdt,
where the last equality come from a change of variable. We remark at this stage that Ψλpzq
represents the Laplace transform of P0pz0, z; tq at frequency λ, that is
Ψλpzq 
»  8
0
P0pz0, z; tqe
λtdt  Lpλ; z0, zq, (74)
83The details of the following algebraic derivations are available upon request from the authors.
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where Lpλ; z0, zq is defined by (70) if z0 ¤ z, and by (71), if z0 ¡ z, with ρ  λ in both cases.
We now continue the proof by introducing the Kolmogorov backward differential equation
(recall that the time variable is t) for P0pz0, z; tq,
1
2
σ2
B2P0
Bz20
pz0, z; tq   η
BP0
Bz0
pz0, z; tq 
BP0
Bt
pz0, z; tq, (75)
and the related Laplace transform, Lpρ; z0, zq 
³ 8
0 P0pz0, z; tqe
ρtdt.
We can now compute the aggregate job destruction rate δ using relation (18). One can
easily show that δ  1{Lpλ; 0, Rˆq. Another way to find the same result is based on the
autocoerence of the distribution, requiring that
³ 8
R ψλpxqdx  1, where ψλpq is defined by
(40). This condition is equivalent to»  8
R
δ
λ
φ2φ1
pφ2  φ1q
!
Ix¥1   IR x 1xφ1φ2
	
Rφ1φ2

xφ11
)
dx  1, (76)
and it is satisfied if the aggregate rate of job destruction is equivalent to the expression reported
in equation (26), reading
δ 
λ
p1Rφ2q
.
Finally, using the previously established fact that Ψλpzq  Lpρ  λ; z0, zq with z  ln pxq,
z0  0 and Rˆ  ln pRq, we have have that
Ψλpxq 
$'&
'%
φ2
λ
1Rφ1φ2
φ2φ1
xφ1 if x ¥ 1
φ2
λ
1Rφ1φ2
φ2φ1
xφ1   1λ

1 φ2x
φ1φ1xφ2
φ2φ1

if R   x   1 (77)
Then, after we compute the ergodic distribution of x using the fact that ψλpxq  Bp1 
δΨλqpxq{Bx, we have that
ψλpxq 
$'&
'%
δ φ2φ1λ
1Rφ1φ2
φ2φ1
xφ11 if x ¥ 1
δ φ2φ1λ

xφ21Rφ1φ2xφ11
φ2φ1

if R   x   1 (78)
This expression can be rewritten more compactly as in the equation (28) reported in the main
text.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by remarking that the law of the hitting time T¯z

Rˆ
	
of the threshold Rˆ by the
transformed process z is the same as the law of the hitting time T¯x pRq of the threshold R by
the original process x, due to the bijectivity of the logartithmic function.
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Next, we compute the Laplace transform of the random time T¯z

Rˆ
	
^Tλ, namely φpz, ρq 
EreρpT¯zpRˆq^Tλqs, where ρ ¥ 0 is the parameter capturing the frequency of the transform. A
direct application of Feynman-Kac formula (see for instance Borodin and Salminen, 1996, pp.
90-94), shows that φpz, ρq satisfies the following differential equation
1
2
σ2
B2φ
B2z
pz, ρq   η
Bφ
Bz
pz, ρq  pλ  αqφpz, ρq  λ.
The associated boundary conditions are φpRˆ, ρq  1 and limzÑ 8 φpz, ρq  λ{ pλ  ρq, which
follows since P
!
Tλ   T¯z

Rˆ
	)
Ñ 1 as z Ñ  8. It can be verified that this equation has the
unique solution, which can be expressed in terms of x and R as z  ln pxq, and Rˆ  ln pRq,
given by
φpx, ρq 
λ
λ  ρ
 

1
λ
λ  ρ


exp

ln pRq  ln pxq
σ2

η  
a
2pλ  ρqσ2   η2
	
.
Using the theorem of differentiation under integral sign, we then have that
ErT¯x pRq ^ Tλs  
Bφ
Bρ
px, 0q.
A simple computation gives us the expression reported in equation (30).
8.6 Proof of Remark 3
By using equation (17), we get the following expression for employment
L 
θ
θ   δ0
. (79)
Using the expression for δ0 and θ as in equations (27) and (21), with C  0, and multiplying
numerator and denominator by Rˆ , we get, using expression (79), the following equation
L 
Rˆ θ
Rˆ θ   pσ
2
2  µq
. (80)
By applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule, taking the first derivative of the numerator and denominator of
equation (80), we can compute the closed form solution for the employment in the limit case
in which R  1 (ô F  0):
lim
RÑ1
Rˆ θ
Rˆ θ   pσ
2
2  µq
 lim
RÑ1
1
Rθ   Rˆ
  dθ
dR
1
Rθ   Rˆ
  dθ
dR
 1.
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8.7 Comparative Statics Properties of the Economic Equilibrium
Properties p1q and p2q follow from a straightforward implicit differentiation of equations (19)
and (22).
To prove property p3q, we begin by noticing that equation (22) implies that the equilib-
rium reservation productivity R depends on σ only through α. Differentiating implicitly the
equilibrium reservation productivity R with respect to α in equation (22) we obtain that
dR
dα
 R
1Rα   ln pRαq
α p1 αq p1Rαq
, (81)
and this expression is negative since the denominator of (81) is positive, while the numerator
is negative. The denominator of (81) is positive since α   0 and since equation (22) implies
that R   1 for any positive value of F , so that Rα ¡ 1; the fact that 1 a  ln a   0 for every
a  1 also implies that the numerator of (81) is negative. The result that in equilibrium R
decreases with σ follows since Bα{Bσ ¡ 0 by (53).
To prove property p4q it is useful to establish first the following preliminary result. Letting
as before R denote the equilibrium reservation productivity defined by equation (22), using
the expression of dR{dα provided by (81) and rearranging terms, we have that
d
 
R1α

dα
 R1α
1Rα  Rα ln pRαq
α p1Rαq
¡ 0, (82)
since, as already remarked, Rα ¡ 1 and moreover 1 a  a ln paq ¡ 0 for any a ¡ 1.
Observe next that the equilibrium job creation rate θ defined by (21) depends on σ only
through α, and that α affects θ both directly and indirectly through R (which as we already
know by (22) depends on σ only through α). It follows that how σ affects θ depends on the
total derivative of θ with respect to α. By equation (21), the total derivative with respect to
α of the schedule θ  θ pR pαq , αq representing the equilibrium job creation rate as a function
of α can be written as
dθ
dα

pr   λq p1 βq   piβθ
piβ p1R1αq
d
 
R1α

dα
 
pr   λq rpr   λ µq b p1 βq   pr   λ µqCs   θβ
 
1R1α

piβ p1R1αq
. (83)
Since equation (21) can also be written as
θβ
 
1R1α


pr   λq p1 βqR1α
pi
 r rpr   λ µq b p1 βq   pr   λ µqCs , (84)
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combining (83) and (84) we also have that
dθ
dα

pr   λq p1 βq   piβθ
piβ p1R1αq
d
 
R1α

dα
 
pr   λq p1 βqR1α
α2β p1R1αq
, (85)
which is positive since as we already know by (82) d
 
R1α

{dα ¡ 0 and obviously R1α   1.
The result that in equilibrium θ increases strictly with σ follows since Bα{Bσ ¡ 0 by (53).
Finally, property p5q can be demonstrated by observing that the equilibrium reservation
productivity R determined by equation (22) depends on µ both directly and through α, i.e.,
we have that
R  R pα pµq , µq . (86)
The total derivative of this expression with respect to µ can be represented as
dR
dµ

BR
Bα
Bα
Bµ
 
BR
Bµ
.
A straightforward implicit differentiation of (22) implies that BR{Bµ ¡ 0, i.e., holding α con-
stant, R increases with µ. Moreover, we know from (81) that R is strictly decreasing in α and
we know from (53) that Bα{Bµ   0. It follows that dR{dµ ¡ 0.
We can write the job destruction rate as a function of µ using (27) and (86) as
δ  δ pR pα pµq , µq , µq .
The total derivative of this expression with respect to µ can be expressed as
dδ
dµ

Bδ
BR
dR
dµ
 
Bδ
Bµ
.
A straightforward differentiation of equation (27) shows that the direct effect of µ on δ is
negative, i.e., Bδ{Bµ   0, and also that δ increases with R, i.e., Bδ{BR ¡ 0. Since as just
demonstrated R is overall an increasing function of µ, i.e., dR{dµ ¡ 0, we conclude that the
sign of dδ{dµ is ambiguous.
To understand why productivity growth has an ambiguous effect on job creation, notice
that θ depends on µ in a variety of ways. In particular, µ affects θ directly, but also indirectly
through α and through the equilibrium reservation productivity (itself a function of α and µ).
Using (21) and (86), we can write the equilibrium job creation rate as a function of µ as
θ  θ pR pα pµq , µq , α pµq , µq .
The total derivative of this expression with respect to µ can be expressed as
dθ
dµ

Bθ
Bα
Bα
Bµ
 
Bθ
BR
dR
dµ
 
Bθ
Bµ
. (87)
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A straightforward differentiation of equation (21), shows that the direct effect of µ on θ is
positive, i.e., Bθ{Bµ ¡ 0. Moreover, we know that by (21) in equilibrium θ increases with R,
i.e., Bθ{BR ¡ 0, and that R increases with µ, i.e., dR{dµ ¡ 0. This implies that both the
second and the third component of the total derivative of θ with respect to µ (87) are positive.
However, by (85), we know that α has a positive direct effect on θ , i.e., Bθ{Bα ¡ 0, and that
Bα{Bµ   0, which means that the first term of dθ{dµ is negative. Which of the opposite effects
of µ on θ dominates over the other cannot be established a priori.
8.8 Proof of Proposition 3
To determine the voting decision of the employed workers under the condition stated in Propo-
sition 3, i.e., that β ¤ βˆ, we begin by noticing that since the threshold x defined in (34) is
strictly increasing in β, and that at x  1 at β  βˆ. Therefore the condition β ¤ βˆ is
equivalent to
x ¤ 1. (88)
Some simple algebra shows that expression (88) implies that
x  pRq1α pxqα ¤ pxqα

1 pRq1α

,
for any possible value of R, i.e., in the interval rRMIN , 1s (including the status quo R0), where
we remind that RMAX  1 as we are now assuming C  0. This result in turn implies that,
for any x P rR0, x
s, and for any value of R,
W px |R q ¤W px |R q ¤ U p1 | Rq , (89)
since W p |R q is strictly increasing in x. Condition (89) implies therefore that all the workers
who are employed in the status quo in firms with productivity x P rR, xs are better-off as
unemployed in the most flexible economy possible, for any level of R. Moreover since, as we
already know, the value of the unemployed is everywhere strictly increasing in R, their voting
is trivial as U p1 | Rq is maximized at R  1. We conclude that if β ¤ βˆ, all the unemployed
and all the employed workers with productivity in the interval rR0, x
s, for any x ¤ 1, are in
favor of implementing the reform generating maximum labor market flexibility, i.e., R  1.
Lastly, we consider the case of the employed workers with productivity greater than 1. We
know from Lemma 1 that their value is strictly decreasing in R on the interval rx,RMAXs, for
any x ¡ 1. This is because these workers gain nothing from any level of job protection (they
51
expect not to be fired even when R approaches 1), and therefore they potentially bear only
the general equilibrium costs of EPL. Therefore their value is also maximized at R  1, i.e.
they are all in favor of zero firing costs.
We conclude that when β ¤ βˆ, all workers, employed (regardless on productivity) and
unemployed are in favor of a transition to R  1 (i.e., driving to zero any positive existing
level of the firing cost, whatever it is).
8.9 Proof of Lemma 4
We remind that x¯ is defined implicitly by equation (35), setting R0  RMIN and R
1  1.
The fact that Bx¯{Bβ   0 follows immediately from the fact that the left-hand-side of equation
(35) is increasing in x¯ while the right-hand-side of the same equation is decreasing in β. Also,
equation (35) implies that x¯ depends on σ and µ only through α. By differentiating implicitly
x¯ in equation (35) with respect to α, we obtain that
Bx¯
Bα

x¯
!
1 pRMIN q
1α

p1 βqβ1   α2 pRMIN q
1α x¯α rln px¯q  ln pRMIN qs
)
α2

x¯ α pRMIN q
1α x¯α
 .
The sign of this expression is positive since both the numerator and the denominator are
obviously positive. The proof of Lemma 4 follows from how α depends on σ and µ (see (53)).
8.10 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is articulated in three parts. We first show that the possible outcome of a majority
voting process are only three, i.e., the status quo R0, RMIN and 1. Then, we show that the
social preference relation induced by majority voting, denoted as ¡, is transitive (i.e., there
are no Condorcet cycles in voting between the alternatives in question). Finally, we use these
preliminary results to demonstrate that the political equilibrium always exists, and it is either
R  1 or R  RMIN .
Claim 1 Suppose that D R1   R0 such that R
1
¡ R0, then RMIN (i.e., maximum rigidity)
defeats any R such that R ¤ R1 in pairwise comparisons.
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that R1 is preferred to R0 by all and only the employed workers
with productivity above x. Moreover, the value of these workers W p |R q is strictly increasing
in R, for any R ¡ R0. In addition, all the unemployed prefer R
1 to R0 since their value UpRq
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is strictly increasing in R for any R. It follows that if a majority of workers prefer R1 to R0,
then the same majority of workers prefers RMIN to any R such that R ¤ R
1.
Claim 2 Suppose that D R  R2 ¡ R0 such that R
2
¡ R0, then R  1 (i.e., maximum
flexibility) defeats any R such that R ¥ R2 in pairwise comparisons.
Proof. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that R2 is preferred to R0 by all the employed
workers with productivity above x, whose value, W px |R2 q, is strictly increasing in R2. In
addition, R2 is preferred to R0 by all the employed workers with productivity x P rR0, x
2
0q,
where x20 is defined as the level of productivity such that W px20 |R0 q  U pR2q. Moreover, the
value of the unemployed, U pR2q, is strictly increasing in R2. It follows that both these sets of
workers, and the workers who are unemployed in the status quo, prefer R  1 to any R such
that R ¥ R2.
Claim 1 and Claim 2 imply that, in order to characterize the political equilibrium of the
model, we can restrict the attention to the choice between three possible levels of the reservation
productivity, the status quo R0, RMIN and R  1, since any other value of R is defeated in
pairwise comparisons by at least one of these alternatives, i.e., it is not a Condorcet winner.
The rest of the proof leads to the demonstration of the existence of a political equilibrium
and to its characterization. We consider separately the outcomes of the voting over R in the
two possible cases of R0   x¯ and of R0 ¥ x¯, where x¯ is defined as the unique productivity level
such that W px¯ |RMIN q  U p1q.
Case 1 R0   x¯.
We rely on the following preliminary result.
Claim 3 Let x¯0 be defined as the unique productivity level such that W px¯0 |R0 q  U p1q; we
have that x¯   x¯0 if R0 ¡ RMIN , and x¯  x¯0 if R0  RMIN .
Proof. Consider the equation W px |R q  U p1q. Differentiating implicitly this equation
with respect to R, we obtain that
Bx
BR
 
p1 βq p1 αq
βpi
1 xαβpi p1 βq1
Rα   piRx1α
.
The denominator of this expression is positive, and therefore the sign of Bx{BR is positive if
1  xαβpi p1 βq1   0. A simple manipulation of this expression shows that Bx{BR ¡ 0 if
x   x. We already know (see Remark 4) that if β ¡ βˆ, then x¯   x; using the same argument
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as in Remark 4, we conclude that x¯0   x
 if β ¡ βˆ. Since maxtx¯, x¯0u   x
, we have that
Bx{BR ¡ 0 for x P tx¯, x¯0u and, because R0 ¡ RMIN , this implies that x¯0 ¡ x¯. The second
statement of the claim is obvious.
We know from Lemma 1 that RMIN is preferred strictly to R0 by the employed with
productivity x P pR0, x
q. This set has Lebesgue-Stieltjes (henceforth LS) measure84 λ0 
λΨ tpR0, x
quL. Moreover, according to Lemma 2, R0 is preferred to R  1 by the workers
with productivity x P px¯0, x
q, which has LS measure λ1  λΨ tpx¯0, x
quL. Finally, RMIN
is preferred to R  1 by the workers with productivity x P px¯, xq, which has LS measure
λ2  λΨ tpx¯, x
quL. From Claim 3, if R0 ¡ RMIN , then x¯0   x¯ implies that px¯0, x
q  px¯, xq
and therefore the following chain of inequalities holds: λ1   λ2   λ0. We distinguish two
sub-cases, 1A and 1B, depending on the value of λ0.
Sub-case 1A: λ0 ¤ 1{2. In this case, λ1 and λ2 and also both lower than 1{2 since λ1   λ2  
λ0. This means that R0 ¡ RMIN , 1 ¡ R0 and 1 ¡ RMIN ñ R  1 defeats any alternative.
Sub-case 1B: λ0 ¡ 1{2. We have to consider three possibilities. (1) λ1 and λ2 are also both
greater than 1{2. In this case, we have that RMIN ¡ R0, R0 ¡ 1 and RMIN ¡ 1 ñ RMIN
defeats any alternative. (2) λ1   1{2 and λ2 ¥ 1{2. In this case we have that RMIN ¡ R0,
1 ¡ R0, and RMIN ¡ 1 ñ RMIN defeats any alternative. (3) λ1 and λ2 are both lower than
1{2. In this case, we have that RMIN ¡ R0, 1 ¡ R0, and 1 ¡ RMIN ñ R  1 defeats any
alternative.
We conclude that the social preference relation ¡ induced by majority voting is transitive,
i.e., a conditional political equilibrium exists. Moreover, R  1 defeats any alternative in
pairwise comparisons if λ2 ¥ 1{2 and, vice versa, R  1 defeats any alternative in pairwise
comparisons if λ2   1{2.
If R0  RMIN , Claim 3 implies that x¯0  x¯, i.e., λ1  λ2. It is straightforward to deduce
that the political equilibrium exists also in this special case, and it is the same as described
above.
Case 2 R0 ¥ x¯.
In this case, we have that λ2  λ0. The proof is almost identical to the one relative to that
of Case 1 and it is therefore omitted.
84We remind that Ψλ pq is defined as a distribution function across employment, and thus we need to multiply
λΨ by L to compute the size of the coalition in question.
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Table 1: Effect of the firing cost F on the aggregate job destruction rate δ, the reservation
productivity R, the exit rate from unemployment θ and employment L.
F δ R θ L
0.01 0.9397 0.9467 1.6485 0.6369
0.03 0.6686 0.9241 1.1697 0.6363
0.05 0.5487 0.9067 0.9586 0.6360
0.07 0.4771 0.8918 0.8327 0.6358
0.09 0.4283 0.8786 0.7443 0.6357
0.10 0.4091 0.8724 0.7134 0.6356
0.12 0.3776 0.8609 0.6587 0.6356
0.14 0.3526 0.8501 0.6152 0.6357
0.18 0.3152 0.8304 0.5504 0.6359
0.20 0.3006 0.8212 0.5252 0.6360
0.24 0.2769 0.8040 0.4845 0.6363
0.28 0.2584 0.7880 0.4529 0.6368
0.30 0.1497 0.7803 0.4396 0.6370
β0.4; C0.01; r0.05.
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Table 2: Effect of the worker’s rent extraction power β on the reservation productivity R, the
exit rate from unemployment θ and employment L.
β R θ L
0.3 0.8822 1.1963 0.7308
0.4 0.8724 0.7134 0.6356
0.5 0.8598 0.4358 0.5376
0.6 0.8425 0.2611 0.4366
0.7 0.8168 0.1465 0.3326
0.8 0.7729 0.0709 0.2257
0.9 0.6692 0.0234 0.1163
F0.1; C0.01; r0.05.
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Table 3: Effect of the discounting rate r on employment L.
r L
0.01 0.5989
0.02 0.6090
0.03 0.6184
0.04 0.6275
0.05 0.6356
0.06 0.6435
0.07 0.6510
0.08 0.6582
0.09 0.6650
F0.1; β0.4; C0.01.
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Table 4: Effect of the exogenous job destruction rate λ on the value of a firm J .
λ J
0.1 17.9735
0.3 22.6915
0.5 25.9522
0.7 35.7953
0.9 40.3404
1.0 41.5931
1.2 41.4432
1.4 37.6643
1.6 31.3408
1.8 23.5653
2.0 15.9251
β0.4; C0.01; r0.05; x=0.3.
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Table 5: Effect of the drift of the productivity µ on the aggregate job destruction rate δ.
µ δ
0.01 1.7535
0.03 1.7521
0.06 1.7512
0.09 1.7503
0.12 1.7506
0.15 1.7520
0.18 1.7544
0.20 1.7563
β0.4; C0.01; r0.05; σ=0.7.
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Table 6: Effect of the exogenous job destruction rate λ on the aggregate job destruction rate
δ.
λ δ
0.1 1.8706
0.14 1.8143
0.18 1.7814
0.20 1.7703
0.24 1.7506
0.28 1.7493
0.30 1.7478
0.34 1.7481
0.38 1.7514
0.40 1.7544
0.44 1.7616
0.48 1.7695
0.50 1.7746
β0.4; C0.01; r0.05; σ=0.8.
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Figure 1: Employment L for different values of the firing cost F .
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Figure 2: Employment L for different values of the rent extraction power β.
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